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One way to build large-scale autonomous systems is to develop an open multi-agent system 
using peer-to-peer architectures in which agents are not pre-engineered to work together and in 
which agents themselves determine the social norms that govern collective behaviour. The social 
norms and the agent interaction models can be described by Electronic Institutions such as those 
expressed in the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a compact executable specification 
language based on logic programming and pi-calculus. Open multi-agent systems have 
experienced growing popularity in the multi-agent community and are expected to have many 
applications in the near future as large scale distributed systems become more widespread, e.g. 
in emergency response, electronic commerce and cloud computing. A major practical limitation 
to such systems is security, because the very openness of such systems opens the doors to 
adversaries for exploit existing vulnerabilities.  
This thesis addresses the security of open multi-agent systems governed by electronic 
institutions. First, the main forms of attack on open multi-agent systems are introduced and 
classified in the proposed attack taxonomy. Then, various security techniques from the literature 
are surveyed and analysed. These techniques are categorised as either prevention or detection 
approaches. Appropriate countermeasures to each class of attack are also suggested.  
A fundamental limitation of conventional security mechanisms (e.g. access control and 
encryption) is the inability to prevent information from being propagated. Focusing on 
information leakage in choreography systems using LCC, we then suggest two frameworks to 
detect insecure information flows: conceptual modeling of interaction models and language-
based information flow analysis. A novel security-typed LCC language is proposed to address 
the latter approach.  
Both static (design-time) and dynamic (run-time) security type checking are employed to 
guarantee no information leakage can occur in annotated LCC interaction models. The proposed 
security type system is then formally evaluated by proving its properties. A limitation of both 
conceptual modeling and language-based frameworks is difficulty of formalising realistic 




Finally, the proposed security-typed LCC is applied to a cloud computing configuration case 
study, in which virtual machine migration is managed. The secrecy of LCC interaction models 
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Open Multi-agent Systems (MASs) are experiencing growing popularity in the Multi-agent 
Systems community and are expected to have many applications in the near future, e.g. in 
emergency response, electronic commerce and cloud computing. An open system is a system 
that allows new components, which may have been created by different parties or for different 
objectives, and are not known at design time, to interact at run-time with existing components 
(Poslad and Calisti 2000). An open multi-agent system (MAS) is an open system in which agents 
can join and leave freely (Demazeau and Rocha Costa 1996). We focus on open MASs with 
dynamic interactions, in which electronic institutions (Esteva, et al. 2001) are used to form the 
interaction environment by defining social norms for group behaviour. 
Considering the agents’ interaction model, open MASs can be divided into three types, each 
with different security issues. In the first category it is assumed that agents are completely 
autonomous and that there is no assumption about protocols except that messages are passed 
(maximum autonomy and flexibility). In this case, since neither information is available about 
protocols nor about agents, we cannot ensure the security of interactions beyond assuming that 
agents individually may manage or just rely on the security of lower layers.  
In the second type, there is one fixed protocol (an electronic institution) for agent 
communication. This is closer to traditional security models than the first type and is more likely 
to be standardised by means of conventional security mechanisms and reasoning about protocol 
security properties but is too rigid for many applications of knowledge sharing in MASs, e.g. in 
emergency response  and distributed healthcare protocols. This is because of the necessity of 
global semantic agreement between agents. 
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The third class of MASs utilises multiple protocols for different applications so that agents 
may play roles in various electronic institutions. In the most general case, agents may invent the 
protocols themselves and share them with others or use other (unknown) agents’ protocols; e.g. 
the OpenKnowledge system (Robertson, Giunchiglia, et al. 2008). If the first and second types 
are assumed as two extremes, the third type will be a solution somewhere in the middle that is 
quite flexible. We refer to this type as open MAS governed by electronic institutions or open 
MAS with dynamic interactions. In this thesis, henceforth, the notion of open MAS is taken to 
stand for open MAS governed by electronic institutions.  
This thesis investigates security issues in these open MASs and proposes a security analysis 
framework for open MASs with dynamic interactions. The reminder of this chapter introduces 
the problem, lists the contributions of this work and describes the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Problem 
Security is a major practical limitation to the advancement of open MAS. Although openness in 
open MASs makes them attractive for different new applications, new problems emerge, among 
which security is a key issue. The more these systems are used in the real world, the more the 
importance of their security requirements will be obvious to users and system designers. 
Unfortunately there remain many potential gaps in the security of open MASs and little research 
has been done in this area, leaving systems vulnerable.  
A MAS could be defined as a subcategory of a software system, a high level application on 
top of the OSI1 networking model; therefore the security of MASs is not a completely different 
and new concept; it is a sub-category of computing security. However, some traditional security 
mechanisms resist use in MAS directly, because of the social nature of MASs and the 
consequent special security needs (Robles 2008). In open MASs the autonomy, openness and 
independence of agents from human users brings about new threats, undetectable using 
traditional security mechanisms that consider the lower network layers. Open MASs are 
particularly difficult to protect, because we can provide only minimum guarantees about the 
identity and behaviour of agents.  
                                                           
1 Open Systems Interconnection 
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Moreover, many traditional security solutions may not be completely appropriate for open 
MAS without further adaptations. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and 
encryption do not provide end-to-end security for agents’ interactions and are at best a small 
(though necessary) part of the solution.  
Confidentiality is one of the main features of a secure system that is challenging (to be 
assured) in open MAS. Open MASs are convenient platforms to share knowledge and 
information, however usually there exists some sensitive information that we want to protect. 
The openness of these systems increases the potential for unintentional leaking of sensitive 
information. Thus, it is crucial to have mechanisms that guarantee confidentiality and to assure 
that the publicly accessible information during the interactions is what we deliberately want to 
share. 
Cloud Computing is an emerging application of open MAS that is a common target for 
confidentiality attacks. Clouds raise new privacy and confidentiality concerns as data are usually 
managed by external parties on remote data centres and various services have access to them. 
These concerns grows in new cloud computing paradigms such as hybrid and community clouds, 
which enlarge their capabilities through engaging different parties through employing non-
centralised approaches and peer-to-peer technologies. Information leakage in cloud computing is 
a vulnerability that may cause serious privacy issues. 
The following section provides a brief introduction to the proposed approach. 
 
1.2 The Proposed Approach 
We have completed a programme of research that addresses security of open MASs governed by 
electronic institution by analysing potential attacks against such systems, reviewing possible 
security countermeasures and proposing a formal framework for deploying end-to-end security 
policies. The proposed security framework of this thesis is aimed primarily at addressing the 
information leakage problem by analysing information flows in agents’ interactions. Secure 
information flow is an end-to-end security policy, where not only access to information is 
restricted, but also the use of information. We have also investigated this issue in a cloud 
configuration management example used as a case study. 
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We use the OpenKnowledge architecture (Dupplaw, Kotoulas and Siebes 2007) as a portable 
platform of electronic institutions, whenever our security analysis depends on the infrastructure. 
To illustrate agents’ interactions, we use the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a 
suitable language to implement social norms. Our security analysis focus is on general aspects of 
the OpenKnowledge system and the LCC language (as much as possible), so it is inclusive 
enough to be generalised to other open MASs governed by electronic institutions. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
The main contribution of this thesis is proposing a formal framework for analysing information 
flow in open MASs governed by electronic institutions through proposing the security-typed 
LCC language. This framework provides end-to-end confidentiality in open MASs according to 
the defined security policy; i.e. an open MAS prevents information leaks through the agents’ 
interactions by employing security-typed LCC. Confidentiality is guaranteed by proofing 
security properties of the security-typed LCC language.  
Other contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
• Categorising potential attacks against open MASs governed by electronic 
institutions and presenting a three-layer taxonomy of attacks, which helps 
understand the implications of attacks and the potential defence mechanisms against 
them. 
• Reviewing security countermeasures to the attacks and classifying security solutions 
that follow detection and prevention approaches.  
• Proposing a framework for information leakage analysis using the conceptual 
modeling approach, in which LCC interaction models are converted into another 
formalisation, and then an existing tool analyses the new formalism to find 
information leaks.  
• Implementing a prototypical LCC interpreter that employs dynamic information 
flow analysis to protect confidential information at run-time. This demonstrates that 
the proposed framework is feasible and can be automated. 
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• Evaluation of the proposed security-typed LCC by proofing progress and 
preservation of the security type system. This guarantees type safety in the security 
typed LCC. 
• Formal definition of non-interference for the security-typed LCC. Non-interference 
is a popular information flow property, which enforces all executions of an 
interaction model look identical to an observer (adversary) and guarantees absence 
of any information flow between secret and public systems activities in well-typed 
LCC interaction models.  
• Applying the language-based security framework to cloud management scenarios 
for information flow analysis in a cloud computing case study. Insecure information 
flows in two scenarios of virtual machine migration management using the LCC 
interaction models are analysed. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows:  
Chapter 2 provides the background needed to obtain a better understanding of the 
discussions and techniques presented in the next chapters. It introduces the OpenKnowledge 
system and the LCC language. 
Chapter 3 explores potential attacks against open MASs and defines a taxonomy of attacks. 
It also applies a risk assessment technique on these attacks, in order to facilitate prioritising 
response or preventive measures against them. This chapter is based on the work published in 
(Bijani and Robertson 2012) and (Bijani, Robertson and Aspinall 2011). 
Chapter 4 surveys and analyses various techniques to secure open MASs and suggests 
appropriate prevention and detection techniques for the attacks introduced in Chapter 3. This 
chapter is mainly based on the work published in (Bijani and Robertson 2012) . 
Chapter 5 addresses the information leakage problem in open MAS and develops two 
secrecy analysis frameworks for LCC interaction models: conceptual modeling and language-
based information flow analysis. This chapter is partially based on the work published in (Bijani, 
Robertson and Aspinall 2011) 
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Chapter 6 develops a novel security type system for the LCC language as a language-based 
information flow analysis technique. This security-typed LCC avoids the information leaks 
problem by static or dynamic security checking. Several properties of this security type system 
are proven and some extensions to the proposed technique are discussed. 
Chapter 7 investigates information leakage analysis in an application of open MAS in cloud 
computing using the security framework proposed in Chapter 6. Some of this chapter’s material 
has been published in the following papers:  (Anderson, Bijani and Vichos 2012) and (Anderson, 
Bijani and Herry 2013). 
Chapter 8 finally, concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the contributions and 
discussing some future directions for research. 
 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced this thesis by presenting the problem, briefly describing the overall 
approach, listing the contributions and outlining the structure of the thesis. The next chapter 
provides a short introduction to the OpenKnowledge framework and describes the LCC 
language used throughout this thesis. 









This chapter provides the background needed to obtain a better understanding of the discussions 
and techniques presented in the next chapters. It briefly introduces the LCC language and the 
OpenKnowledge system. 
 
2.2 Electronic Institutions 
An electronic institution (Esteva, et al. 2001) is an organisation model for multi-agent systems 
that provides a framework to describe, specify and deploy agent interaction environments 
(Joseph, et al. 2006). It is a formalism which defines agents’ interaction rules and their permitted 
and prohibited actions. Lightweight Coordination Calculus, LCC (Robertson 2005), is a 
declarative language to execute electronic institutions in a peer to peer style. In LCC, electronic 
institutions are called interaction models. While electronic institutions can be used to implement 
security requirements of a multi-agent system, they also can be turned against agents to breach 
their security in a variety of ways, as this chapter shows.  In this thesis, the terms electronic 
institutions and interaction models are used interchangeably. 
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2.3 Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) 
In our security analysis, Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) is used to implement 
interaction models and formulate attacks. LCC is a compact executable specification language 
used to describe the notion of social norms and is based on logic programming.  
An interaction model in LCC is defined as a set of clauses, each of which specifies a role 
and its process of execution and message passing. The LCC syntax is shown in Fig.  2-1. 
Interaction Model := {Clause,...} 
Clause := Role::Def 
Role := a(Type, Id) 
Def := Role | Message | Def then Def | Def or Def | null<- C | Role <- C 
Message := M => Role  |  M => Role <- C  |  M <= Role  | C <- M <= Role  
C:= Constant | P(Term,...) | ¬ C | C ∧ C | C ∨ C 
Type := Term 
Id := Constant | Variable 
M:= Term 
Term:= Constant | Variable | P(Term,...) 
Constant:= lower case character sequence or number 
Variable := upper case character sequence or number 
Fig.  2-1: LCC language syntax; principal operators are: messages (and), conditional 
(<-), sequence (then) and committed choice (or)   
Each role definition specifies all of the information needed to perform that role. The 
definition of a role starts with: a(roleName,PeerID). The principal operators are outgoing 
message (=>), incoming message (<=), conditional (<-), sequence (then) and committed choice 
(or). Constants start with lower case characters and variables (which are local to a clause) start 
with upper case characters. LCC terms are similar to Prolog terms, including support for list 
expressions. Matching of input/output messages is achieved by structure matching, as in Prolog.  
The right-hand side of a conditional statement is a constraint. Constraints provide the 
interface between the IM and the internal state of the agent. These would typically be 
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implemented as a Java component which may be private to the peer, or a shared component 
registered with a discovery service. 
Role definitions in LCC can be recursive and the language supports structured terms in 
addition to variables and constants so that, although its syntax is simple, it can represent 
sophisticated interactions.  Notice also that role definitions are “stand alone” in the sense that 
each role definition specifies all the information needed to complete that role.  This means that 
definitions for roles can be distributed across a network of computers and (assuming the LCC 
definition is well engineered) will synchronise through message passing while otherwise 
operating independently.  
Robertson (2005) defined the following clause expansion mechanism for agents to unpack 
any LCC interaction model they receive and suggested applying rewrite rules to expand the 
interaction state: 
 	,		,
, , … ,  		,	,
,  
where Cn is an expansion of the original LCC clause Ci in terms of the interaction model P and 
in response to the set of received messages Mi, On is an output message set, Mn is a remaining 
unprocessed set of messages. 
 The rewrite rules allow an agent to conform to the interaction model by unpacking clauses, 
finding the next step and updating the interaction state. The rewrite rules are defined in the LCC 
interpreter, which should be installed on each agent running LCC codes. For more information 
about the LCC expansion algorithm see (Robertson 2005) and (Robertson, Barker, et al. 2009). 
The LCC rewrite rules are in the form of  ,	,, , where Y is the expansion of X, Mi is 
the initial set of messages, O is the output message set, and Mo is the subset of Mi, which is not 
yet processed and S is the interaction model. As the result of the thirteen rewrite rules in 
Fig.  2-2, one clause of an interaction model is expanded. The first rule starts unpacking a clause 
by expanding the body of it (B) and the rules (2) to (13) expand different parts of the clause 
body. c(X) is the notion of closing an LCC term X and based on the closed rules (10) to (19), an 
LCC term X is decided to be closed. 
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	   (11) 
,  ←  !, ,	,
,∅		,  ∷  	  #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷   ∧ ,0#,$#-.	 (12) 
,  !,,	,
,∅		 ,  ∷  				    #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷  	  (13) 
 
*+&,-.B*C          (14) *+&,-.$+,-          (15) *+&,-.%	&'	  ← *+&,-.%	∨ 	*+&,-.        (16) *+&,-.%	3'	  ← *+&,-.% 	∧ 	*+&,-.       (17) *+&,-.%	0ℎ-2	  ← *+&,-.% 	∧ 	*+&,-.       (18) *+&,-. ∷   ← *+&,-.         (19) 
 ,0#,$#-.¬ ← ¬,0#,$#-.       (20) ,0#,$#-. ∨ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∨ 	,0#,$#-.(     (21) ,0#,$#-. ∧ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∧ 	,0#,$#-.(     (22) ,0#,$>¬ ← ¬,0#,$>        (23) ,0#,$> ∨ ( ← ,0#,$> 	∨ 	,0#,$>(      (24) ,0#,$> ∧ ( ← ,0#,$> 	∧ 	,0#,$>(      (25) 
 
Fig.  2-2: The LCC rewrite rules for  expansion of one clause P in an interaction model. 
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In the rewriting rules (Fig.  6-4), ,0#,$> is true if the agent’s state of knowledge can be made 
such that C is satisfied and ,0#,$#-. is true if C can be solved from the agent’s current state of 
knowledge. Whenever the condition of each rule is not fulfilled, it returns false; e.g. in the rule 8, 
if no message is received, 7 ⇐ % !,,	 ,
,∅		 $+,-. Similarly in the rule 9, if the condition 
,0#,$#-. is false, then 7 ⇒ % ← 	 !, ,	,
,∅ $+,-.  
In (Robertson, Barker, et al. 2009) the behaviour of agents coordinated through LCC 
definitions is defined in terms of traces produced via application of rewrites to LCC clauses. 
Here, S is the state of an interaction, Mi is the initial set of messages, p is a unique identifier 
for a peer. i(S, Mi, Sf) is true when the sequence of interactions and an initial set of messages Mi 
change the initial state of the interaction model S and security environment ∆ to the state Sf and 
the security environment ∆′. E ⊇G EH (26) selects a clause Sp from the interaction state S. EH ∪G E 
merges specific clause Sp to S and generates a new interaction state S′. 
#BE,7 , EIC 	↔ 	 BE = EIC 	∨
L
MMN
E ⊇G EH 																				∧EH ,	 ,,EOH 						∧EH ∪G E = EO 													 ∧	#BEO,7P, EIC												 Q
RRS    (26) 
E ⊇G EH 	↔ 	∃	,  . EH ∈ E				 ∧ 			EH = ,  ∷  	         (27) 
 Fig.  2-3: definition of a trace through an LCC interaction model S.  
 
 
2.4 The OpenKnowledge System 
As part of our security analysis, we have studied security of the OpenKnowledge (OK) system 
as a portable engineering style of electronic institutions. OpenKnowledge can also be considered 
as a multi-agent system in which agents can interact without any prior agreements or knowledge 
of other agents or interactions. OK, which has a strong peer-to- peer capability, is a knowledge 
sharing method based on sharing knowledge in the context of the interactions, in which the 
knowledge plays a role. OK interprets transmitting knowledge between peers in a similar way to 
electronic institutions in multi-agent systems (Robertson, Giunchiglia, et al. 2008). Agents must 
have the OK kernel to be a member of the OK system. 




Fig.  2-4: An OpenKnowledge peer architecture 
 
The OK kernel, which is shared amongst autonomous peers (agents), is responsible for 
interpreting and executing the specifications of interactions. It includes an interpreter, a 
coordination unit (which is only active in coordinator peers) and some service modules 
(Fig.  2-4). Two basic modules of the OK system are interaction model (IM) and OK component 
(OKC). IM is a formal specification of roles and interactions between them and OKCs 
implement roles and contain methods to solve the IM's constrains. The interpreter interprets and 
executes the IM and when it reaches a constraint, it uses the assigned OKC to fulfil it. A 
coordinator is a randomly selected peer who coordinates all the interacting peers, allocates the 
roles to the peers and simulates all message passing locally within the current interaction to find 
and assign the appropriate OKCs. OK also has a main service called Discovery and Team 
Formation (DTS), and two optional services: Trust and Reputation service (a symmetric 
reputation system which determines trustfulness of the OKCs and peers) and Mapping Service 
(ontology mapping for the IMs and OKCs). The main responsibilities of the DTS are the 
following (Dupplaw, Kotoulas and Siebes 2007): publishes, discovers, retrieves and stores IMs 
and OKCs, subscribes peer roles when the peers request, selects and initiates the coordinator 
peer. 
OK components provide a way to extend an interaction’s functionality to include more 
sophisticated tasks. The use of components is integrated in the LCC interaction models in the 
form of constraints. This makes LCC a powerful and flexible tool to implement many 
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3. Attacks on MAS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and classifies important attacks on open MASs governed by electronic 
institutions. In our investigation, the attacker model, which describes the attacker’s capabilities, 
is built on the assumption that the interpreter of the interaction models and the machines that run 
them are trusted. The attacker model also does not include attacks against the physical machine, 
where the agent run on. The adversary may perform an attack by creating or publishing a 
malicious interaction model. 
Studying all possible attacks on such systems is too broad an area, so the scope of the topic 
needs to be limited. In this study, we do not emphasise dealing security issues that are specific to 
the mobility of mobile agents i.e. attacks from hosts on agents and vice versa. We assume that 
the interface between the agent platform and the agent is secure to focus on attacks by agents on 
other agents rather than on the infrastructure. Moreover, we assume that some confidential and 
important information exists in the open MAS, in order for some attacks to be worthwhile.  
In this chapter, we first introduce an attack taxonomy, then discuss each attack, next propose 
a risk analysis of the attacks and finally summarise this chapter. The LCC language is used to 
formulate attacks in this study. 
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3.2 Attack Taxonomy 
As a part of our security analysis, we categorised various attacks on open MAS. Attack or 
vulnerability taxonomies are designed for different purposes (Igure and Williams 2008): 1) to 
develop automated tools for performing security assessment, 2) to provide a way to explore 
unknown attacks and 3) to understand the attacks’ implications and the defence mechanism 
against them. The latter is the main goal of our attack classification, which is valuable for the 
prevention, detection and response to potential attacks.  
Attacks on (open) MASs can be categorised in different ways, however we suggest a three-
layer taxonomy as illustrated in Fig.  3-1. The first level of our classification is based on 
violations against the four main security properties i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
accountability. In the second level we categorise attacks based on the novelty of the technique 
used to run an attack, namely, traditional and modern attack techniques. The third level of attack 
classification is grounded on the attack target, which could be sender agents, recipient agents and 
transferred information.  
Some dimensions to attack classification might be to some extent fuzzy, for example, in the 
second level, some modern methods could be categorised as traditional. However it does not 
affect our classification objective. We do not intend to have mutually exclusive attack classes, so 
there might be some attacks that could be categorised in more than one class. This taxonomy 
might be tailored for each open MAS with regards to its implementation and application. 
The four classes in the first level of taxonomy are: 1) disclosure attack, 2) modification 
attack, 3) denial of service attack and 4) fake identity attack. We describe the main forms of 
attack introduced in the taxonomy in the following sub-sections. 
 
  




Fig.  3-1: Taxonomy of potential attacks on open MASs. The first level corresponds to 
confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability respectively. The second level 
represent the traditional (the top box) and the modern (the bottom box) techniques in 
the attacks. The third level is grounded on the attack target: sender agents, recipient 
agents and transferred information. 





Although open MASs are usually open to all, this does not mean that there is no confidential 
information in which malevolent people are interested. In the disclosure attack, the attacker tries 
to access confidential information. These attacks are of two types: Firstly, conventional read 
attacks similar to those in the traditional computer security literature. Based on the attacker 
target we have various read attacks:  
(a) Interception: unauthorised access to confidential interaction information; e.g. exploiting 
information leakage in message passing in agents interactions (Fig.  3-2), which is 
described below. 
(b) Unauthorised access to agent: the agent’s information (including its state and code) and 
the agent’s local knowledge could be disclosed to an adversary. In mobile agent systems 
there are threats from the host like reverse engineering and theft of mobile agent 
information (Bierman and Cloete 2002). 
(c) Provenance attack: attack on provenance information of agents and their 
communications. An example of attack on provenance information is when agent A 
sends message M1 to receiver B in an open interaction, maybe A, B and M1 were not 
private to a malicious agent, who is monitoring the interaction, but probably the history 
of the sent messages from A or the agents' names who has interacted with A would be 
confidential information. Disclosure of a mobile agents’ itinerary information to an 
adversary is another example of threat against open MAS. 
 
Fig.  3-2 shows an example of information disclosure in a simple proteomics lab interaction 
model. This is a modified version of the DNA sequencing interaction model (Abian, et al. 2008) 
in the OpenKowledge project and it is used for knowledge sharing between researchers and 
proteomics labs. In this scenario a query is passed on to each laboratory in a list of proteomics 
labs and the results are sent back to the researcher to be analysed. It could be a case that 
proteomics labs may not wish to share all information related to DNA sequencing with 
researchers. An adversary could share the interaction model, in which he/she (in the role of 
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researcher) could ask an implicit query from a proteomics lab agent (omicslab) to access 
commercially important information.   
 
1. a(researcher(LabList), R) :: 
2.  ( ask(X)=>a(omicslab, H) <-  LabList=[H|T]  then 
3.    tell(Y)<= a(omicslab,H) then 
4.    null <- processResult(X,Y,H) 
5.    then a( researcher(T), R) 
6.  ) or 
7.  null <- LabList = [] 
 
8. a(omicslab, O) :: 
9.   ask(X)<= a(researcher,R)then 
10.   tell(Y)=> a(researcher,R)<- Combine(X,Y) 
11.   then a(omicslab, O) 
 
Fig.  3-2: An example of an interception attack using an implicit query, in which a 
malicious researcher could access confidential information of proteomics lab agents. 
An implicit query Combine(X,Y) is asked as a constraint in the omicslab clause (line 
10), receiving the tell(Y) message by the researcher agent informs it that the 
constraint holds. 
 
An implicit query could be asked by placing a query as a constraint in LCC, rather than 
sending a message. In other words, an adversary could not only infer information directly from a 
received message, but also from analysing the constraints in an interaction model. An example 
of confidential information in proteomics lab could be the combination (binding potential) of 
two publicly known proteins that activate a particular gene. In Fig.  3-2, the relation between two 
pieces of public information is confidential; i.e. X and Y are not confidential but a malicious 
researcher, R, could recognise whether proteins X and Y could combine by putting a 
combine(X,Y) constraint in line 10. When O sends the non-confidential tell(Y) message to R it 
will implicitly inform R that X and Y could combine together because R knows that combine(X, 
Y) had to be satisfied before the tell(Y) message could be sent. 
Another example of an unauthorised access to confidential information is illustrated in 
Fig.  3-3. This is a modified fragment of an interaction model in the MIAKT project (Hu, et al. 
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2009), which aims to support multidisciplinary meetings for the diagnosis and management of 
breast cancers. The dataHandler retrieves a patient’s private data based on a request submitted 
by an authorised domain specialist (line 3) and sends it to the specialist. The specialist 
then forwards this information to a nurse, who is not authorised to access the information, 
without any permission check (line 5). 
1. a(dataHandler,H) :: 
2.   credentials(SID,Pass,PID) <= a(specialist,E)   then 
3.   authorised => a(specialist,E) <- is_authorised(E,SID,Pass,PID) then 
4.   request_patient_record(Patient) <= a(specialist,E)   then 
5.   inform(Patient,Record) => a(specialist,E) <-  
6.                     get_patient_record(Patient,ID, Record) then 
7.   ... 
8. a(specialist,E) :: 
9.   credentials(SID,Pass,PID) => a(dataHandler,H)   then 
10.   authorised <= a(dataHandler,H) then 
11.   request_patient_record(Patient) => a(dataHandler,H) then 
12.   process(Record) <- inform(Patient,Record) <= a(dataHandler,H) then ... 
13.   request_patient_record(Patient) <=  a(nurse, N) then  
14.   inform(Patient,Record) => a(nurse, N)  ... 
Fig.  3-3: An interaction model to support specialists meetings for the diagnosis and 
management of breast cancer. The confidential patient’s Record is propagated to an 
unauthorised nurse agent by a specialist agent (line 14).  
 
Secondly, probing attacks, in which an adversary accesses confidential information by 
analysing the results of the sent queries. Whether the attacker target is an ontology of a MAS or 
not, we can classify the probing attack into two types:  (a) ontology attack and (b) active probing 
attack. 
Use of ontologies in MASs is currently popular especially in knowledge-intensive 
applications. In an ontology attack, the attacker accesses the whole ontology by sending many 
queries to a semi-open ontology-based system. In the latter attack, it is assumed that the whole 
ontology is confidential but it is also open to questions about small parts of itself. The attacker 
may find the entire information and relations by asking intelligent and complementary queries 
based on its knowledge of the semantics of the ontology representation language being used by 
the attacked agent (Fig.  3-4). 
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a(ontologyAttacker(S, Os, Of), A) :: 
( ask(subclasses(C)) => a(ontologyService, O) <- S = [C|Sr] then 
tell(subclasses(C,Sc)) <= a(ontologyService, B) then 
a(ontologyAttacker(Sn,On,Of),A) <-  
merge(Sr, Sc, Sn)and merge(Os, Sc, On) 
or 
null <- S = [] and Of = Os 
 
a(ontologyService, B) :: 
ask(subclasses(C)) <= a(ontologyAttacker(_,_,_), A) then  
tell(subclasses(C,Sc)) => a(ontologyAttacker(_,_,_), A) <- 
known_subclasses(C, Sc) then  
a(ontologyService, B) 
Fig.  3-4: A sample interaction model of an ontology attack: an attacker A starts from 
the ontology root (S) and rebuilds the ontology (Of) by asking for subclasses of each 
node from the ontology service B. Initially S = Os = the ontology root. The merge 
function merges the two first arguments and into the third argument. Finally, the 
copied ontology Os will save into Of. 
 
Another type of probing attack is active probing attack, in which an adversary accesses the 
private local knowledge (e.g. decision rules and policies) of the victim agent. The active probing 
happens by injection of some facts into the agent’s knowledge-base, asking queries before and 
after the injection and analysing results. We described an example attack on an LCC interaction 




This class of attack is against the integrity of the system. An integrated system guarantees that 
information has not been tampered with during handling (Mitchell 2003). A modification attack 
on an open MAS happens when a malevolent agent modifies a piece of information in the 
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system. Based on the novelty of the attack technique, the modification attack on open MASs 
could be classified as an altering and injection attack.  
We classified altering attacks based on the attack target, which could be the interaction, the 
agent itself, or the agent’s log files, into: (a) modification of the agents’ interactions by altering 
the transferring information (e.g. messages), (b) altering the agent code (e.g. interaction model), 
data and configuration and (c) altering the event logging system of a MAS. A malicious agent 
can exploit general vulnerabilities like buffer overflow to perform the attack. In buffer overflow 
attacks, an adversary tries to corrupt the execution stack of the agent code in order to take over 
the agent controller and to run arbitrary code. 
An example of an interaction modification attack is similar to the one in peer to peer 
systems called the colluded truncation attack (Yue, et al. 2009) in which two or more malicious 
agents, who surround a sender agent, collude to modify a sent message. Silei et al. (2008) 
explained the same idea in an attack from a host to mobile agent’s code. Modification attacks are 
usually dependent upon intruding on low level network communication layers.  
Another type of modification attack is the injection attack, which is similar to active probing 
attack. The objective of the adversary in injection attack is twofold: to infuse forged information 
into MAS and to inject some facts into the system to be able to infer confidential information. 
Injection attack is classified into message injection and knowledge injection. In the message 
injection attack, an adversary injects fake messages or malicious interaction models into an open 
MAS to change or control the interaction between agents while in knowledge injection untruthful 
facts are added into an agent’s knowledge base to affect the agent decisions (Bijani, Robertson 
and Aspinall 2011).  
There also could be an active probing attack on an open MAS that use ontology merging, 
e.g. an intelligent adversary can build a well-designed ontology and add (inject) it to a 
confidential ontology during the ontology merging procedure. As a result of merging, a new 
ontology emerges that may leak confidential information. This is because the adversary knows 
some parts of the new ontology, so he/she can access confidential parts of it by sending carefully 
crafted queries.  
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3.5 Denial of Service (DoS) 
In a denial of service attack on MASs the attacker attempts to prevent the system to provide the 
intended services to its legitimate users. The goal of DoS may be wasting other agents' resources, 
delaying the service, making real users forsake the system or ruining the system’s reputation. A 
malicious agent may attack just one agent or a group of agents. When more than one attacker 
collaborates in a DoS attack, this is called a distributed denial of service (DDoS). As in 
computer networks (but here, with a different meaning) a DoS attack can be divided into two 
types (Traynor, McDaniel and Porta 2008): flooding and logical attacks. 
Flooding DoS happens when too many messages are sent to one or more agents to 
overwhelm the victim agent or the connection to an agent by consuming the agent or network 
resources (e.g.: the agent's message buffer or the communication bandwidth).  
a (attacker(PeerList), A) :: 
       null <- PeerList = [] 
  or ( 
         m(PeerList) =>  a(zombie,Z) <-PeerList=[H|T]  
          then  a(attacker(T), A)   
     ) 
a(zombie, Z):: 
       m(PeerList)<= a(attacker(_), A) then 
a(attacker(PeerList),Z) 
Fig.  3-5: An example of a simple interaction model for logical DoS: An attacker sends 
a message ‘m’ including the list of agents to all agents. Each agent who receives this 
message changes its role to an attacker and starts sending messages to others.  
 
While flooding is almost a blind attack, a logical DoS uses more sophisticated methods to 
exploit software or system bugs. In open MASs with dynamic interaction models, any user can 
publicise an interaction model, a malevolent agent may publish an interaction model to make 
other agents send many messages to each other (Fig.  3-5), do worthless tasks (Fig.  3-6) or 
remain in infinite loops. Another kind of logical DoS is that one hostile agent does not play its 
role correctly to terminate or interrupt a popular interaction. In (Sit and Morris 2002) a similar 
attack called store and retrieve is introduced in peer to peer systems. Inconsistent behaviour (Sit 
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and Morris 2002) of a malicious peer in behaving with other peers also can be categorised as a 
logical DoS attack. 
 
a (attacker(PeerList, K), A) :: 
       null <- PeerList = [] 
  or ( 
        trigger(K) =>  a(zombie, Z) <- PeerList=[H|T]  
        then  a(attacker(T,K), A)   
     ) 
 
a(zombie, Z):: 
      trigger(K) <= a(attacker(_), A) then  a(in-loop(K),Z) 
a(in_loop(K),Z):: 
null<- K = []      or 
  a(in_loop(K1),Z) <- K1 =[a|L]  
Fig.  3-6: Another example of a simple interaction model for logical DoS: An attacker 
sends a trigger message including a number ‘K’ to all agents. Each agent who receives 
this message, starts looping for ‘K’ times (‘K’ may be a very large number).  
 
These malicious behaviours could be camouflaged as part of a real interaction model in a 
way that zombie peers cannot be guaranteed to detect them via static analysis of the interaction 
(even when the specification of this interaction is explicit, as in our examples) 
 
3.6 Fake Identity 
Fake identity is a reinterpretation of a Sybil attack (Douceur 2002)  in open MAS. In peer to peer 
networks, a Sybil attack is an attack in which an attacker subverts the reputation system by 
generating a huge number of pseudonymous peers to abuse the resources or to affect the system 
in a way that he/she wants. The fake identity attack is divided into two classes: deception and 
repudiation attacks. 
Different versions of the deception attack are as follows: 
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a) Fake messages: Having a fake identity makes it easy for an attacker to send deceptive 
information to others. An example of the sort of system exposed to this vulnerability is the 
OKOmics system (Sierra, et al. 2008), by which proteomic researchers can send queries to 
different laboratories and compare the results. If an attacker could pretend to be a legitimate 
proteomics laboratory, then it could deceive researches by returning wrong answers to their 
queries about sequence identification. 
 
b) Fake agents: An attacker plays many roles in a genuine interaction. e.g.: in an auction, many 
fake bidder agents may be created by an attacker to demolish the auction. 
 
c) Fake services: An attacker creates an entirely fake interaction with fake agents for deception 
or fraudulence. e.g.: a completely fake auction interaction with a pseudo auctioneer and bidders 
to attract real agents and deceive them. 
 
d) Reputation attack: A group of attackers combine to deceive the reputation mechanism; e.g. 
many malicious agents may collude to increase their own rank and thus deceive a trust service 
into believing that they are trusted agents. 
 
Another class of fake identity attack is repudiation, which may be a result of an attack on the 
trust service in an open MAS. When benign agents believe in the reliability of a malicious agent 
by relying on a deceived trust service, they will probably interact with it. Then the malicious 
agent may send requests (e.g.: buying) to others (e.g.: resellers), but then repudiate its requests at 
the final stages (e.g. by logging wrong data to log files) to reach its goal (e.g.: to bring the 
resellers into disrepute amongst sellers or to defame the whole system to all benign users). An 
attacker may also deny its pervious actions by repudiation of its identity and changing the 
authoring information of his/her actions.  
It is mainly the responsibility of the trust service of the MAS to prevent the fake identity 
attacks, but most trust services are based on a symmetric reputation algorithm, which is proven 
not to be Sybil-proof (Cheng and Friedman 2005), so cannot guarantee against these  attacks.  




3.7 Risk Assessment 
Attacks bring about risks that have to be studied and modelled to determine and prioritise 
effective countermeasures against them.  To have a better understanding of potential attack risks 
in an open MAS we present an example of the DREAD risk assessment methodology (Microsoft 
2010). In DREAD the threat (attack) is approached and weighed from the different aspects of 
Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users and Discoverability. The weights 
indicating the risk level of each category are then averaged to calculate an overall risk 
assessment of the threat. The categories of risk in DREAD are: 
• Damage potential indicates the damage caused if an attack occurs,  
• Reproducibility is the ease of attack reproduction, 
• Exploitability shows the simplicity of the attack exploitation, 
• Affected users is a rough estimate of the number of affected agents, 
• Discoverability points out the ease of discovering the vulnerability exploited in the 
attack.  
It has to be noted that each open MAS has a different set of risks with regard to its 
implementation and application, so the weighing mechanism has to be customised accordingly to 
achieve more precise results. To give a sense of this risk assessment technique an example of a 
generic MAS is presented that utilise the following risk levels: high (3), medium (2), and low (1) 
(Table  3-1). The values are based on the reported attacks in the surveyed literature and our 
experience of real world security attacks.    
In our risk analysis, each DREAD category is evaluated as low, medium or high with regard 
to the following explanation. In Damage potential, high may indicate the risk of an adversary 
getting full trust authorisation (e.g. become an administrator), medium could mean the leak of 
sensitive information and low risk might be in revealing unimportant information. In 
Reproducibility, high risk is where attacks are reproduced easily, medium reproducibility is 
when the attack is confined to specific conditions and low reproducibility means the attack is 
very hard to replicate. The Exploitability risk would be rated high if an amateur can take 
advantage of the vulnerability of the system, low if it takes a highly skilled and experienced 
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adversary to carry out the attack. The percentage of affected agents in a MAS would denote the 
risk level of the Affected users category. The Discoverability of an attack would consider the 
information available on the vulnerability: a highly discoverable attack has published 
information about it, while an obscured vulnerability would claim a low risk assessment.   
According to the risk analysis in Table  3-1, interception, link flooding, fake services and 
reputation attacks are the highest risked threats, while message injection has the lowest risks. 
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Table  3-1: A sample DREAD risk assessment for an open MAS. 3: high risk, 2: 
medium risk, 1: low risk.  
                        
                           DREAD risk 


































































 Interception 3 3 2 2 3 2.6 
Access to agents 3 2 2 1 2 2 








Ontology attack 1 2 2 1 2 1.6 







Interaction modification 3 2 2 2 2 2.2 
Agent code modification 3 2 2 2 2 2.2 







Message injection 1 2 1 1 1 1.2 








Link flooding 2 3 3 3 2 2.6 





Logical DoS 2 2 2 3 2 2.2 








 Fake agents 1 3 2 1 2 1.8 
Fake services 3 3 2 2 2 2.4 
Reputation attack 2 3 3 2 2 2.4 
 
 




In this chapter, we have introduced and categorised the main forms of attack on open MASs. A 
three-layer attack taxonomy has been proposed to help understand the implications of attacks 
and the defence mechanisms against them. In the first layer of our taxonomy we have classified 
attacks based on violations against confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability. In 
the second and third layer we have categorised attacks based on the novelty of the attack 
technique and the attack target. In total, we have introduced sixteen attack classes and described 
a number of them, which were independent of the MAS’s platform, in LCC code. A few simple 
examples have been given to clarify the attack concepts. In addition, we have performed a risk 
assessment using the DREAD technique on the attacks, as an example to facilitate prioritising 
response or preventive measures against them. The next chapter discusses potential 
countermeasure to these attacks.  










In this chapter, we survey and analyse various techniques to prevent and detect the attacks 
introduced in Chapter  3 to secure open MASs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
review of security solutions for open MASs, which has been published in (Bijani and Robertson 
2012). We first categorise security solutions following prevention and detection approaches. 
Then, we suggest which security technique is an appropriate countermeasure for which classes 
of attack introduced in Chapter  3. 
This chapter presents research relevant to the security of open MASs, without focusing on 
security issues specific to the mobility of mobile agents i.e. attacks from hosts on agents and 
vice versa. Security of open MAS has been explored greatly in the literature, although only a few 
have focused on open MAS itself and most research has dealt with mobile agents security issues 
either directly or indirectly; so, many of the security solutions have been proposed for threats 
from agents to hosts or from hosts to agents. 
There have been many attempts to protect mobile agents from the host platform in the 
literature (Bierman and Cloete 2002) (Jansen and Karygiannis 2000) and (Oey, Warnier and 
Brazier 2010); some are based on cryptography while others are not; e.g. code obfuscation 
(Majumdar and Thomborson 2005), function encryption (Lee, Alves-Foss and Harrison 2004), 
environmental key generation (Riordan and Schneier 1998), execution tracing (Tan and Moreau 
2002), and agent monitoring (Page, Zaslavsky and Indrawan 2005). Another important security 
issue in mobile agent systems is protecting the agent platform from mobile agents. Some 
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example techniques are: Proof Carrying Code (Necula and Lee 1998), sandboxing (Wahbe, 
Lucco and Anderson 1993) and code signing (Jansen and Karygiannis 2000). However, the 
importance of the security issues coming from the mobility of agents should not diminish the 
importance of many other security threats in open MASs and we will not concentrate on them 
any further. 
Security approaches in the multi-agent security domain can be divided into two parts; the 
first approach is prevention, in which usually encryption-based techniques and authentication 
methods (e.g.: certificates and PKI
1
) are used. Most research on secure MASs follows this 
approach. (Poslad and Calisti 2000), (Wong and Sycara 1999), (Wang, Varadharajan and Zhang 
1999) and (Poslad, Charlton and Calisti 2002) are some examples of using encryption to prevent 
MASs from malicious attacks. For instance, (Poslad and Calisti 2000), (Wang, Varadharajan and 
Zhang 1999) and (Odubiyi and Choudhary 2007) suggest security architectures for the IEEE 
FIPA agent standard by means of authentication, PKI and VPN
2
. Other prevention methods for 
secure MASs are: policy driven and secure development methodologies, e.g. (Mouratidis, 
Giorgini and Weiss 2003). Policy driven methodologies are based on applying security policies, 
which may be used for access control, e.g. (Quillinan, et al. 2008), definition of acceptable 
behaviour, e.g. (Vazquez-Salceda, et al. 2003) or policy randomisation to prevent adversaries 
guess the next agent action, e.g. (Tan, Poslad and Xi 2004). 
The second approach is detection, which tries to detect attacks on MASs and then respond to 
them. Little research has been done in this area and the focus of the work has been on attacks 
and countermeasures in mobile agents, e.g., (Endsuleit and Wagner 2004), (Page, Zaslavsky and 
Indrawan 2005), (Jansen and Karygiannis 2000) and (Bierman and Cloete 2002). The main 
problems in mobile agent systems, which are not in the scope of our review, are threats from 
agents to hosts and vice versa. 
In the following, we describe the contributions of related work to security of open MAS. 
Some of the systems described, although appropriate to open MAS, were developed with other 
architectures in mind. Therefore, the shortcomings we identify for them might not be flaws in 
those other applications. 
                                                           
1 Public Key Infrastructure 
2 Virtual Private Network 




4.2 Prevention Approach 
“Prevention is better than cure”, so the first step against security threats is trying to avoid 
attacks using prevention methods. Various prevention methods with different attitudes, at 
different levels of abstraction and for different goals have been proposed and implemented in the 
literature of MAS security. As one possible way of classification, we have categorised these 
prevention methods as follows: encryption and certificate driven systems, policy-based methods 
and secure agent development techniques. 
 
4.2.1 Encryption and Certificates 
Most existing security solutions for MASs suggest the use of encryption to fulfil confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation in these systems. Symmetric encryption1, public key (or 
asymmetric) encryption2, digital signature and certificate management are the popular methods 
in communication security (Table  4-1).  We discuss specific elements of Table  4-1 below. 
Wang et al. in (1999) have suggested an asymmetric encryption scheme, which is simple and 
lightweight compared to well-known encryption algorithms such as DES and RSA. The 
encryption algorithm consists of compressing the message, N-bit grouping, subtracting from the 
secret key saved in the secret code file and ungrouping. The authors have argued that to guess 
the secret codes, hackers face a combinational explosion problem and also the compression adds 
another security layer. The disadvantages of this method, as the authors indicate, are the 
weakness of the algorithm for short messages and secret key management difficulties, which 
includes producing, transferring and saving large secret files in agents. 
 
 
                                                           
1 In symmetric cryptography, a secret key, shared between both parties, is used for encryption and decryption. Some 
examples of common symmetric encryption algorithms are AES, DES, Triple DES, RC6 and Blowfish. 
2 In asymmetric cryptography a pair of public key and private key are used and everything that encrypted by a public 
key can be decrypted by private key and vice versa. To send a secret message, the sender codes it by the public key of 
receiver and the receiver can decode the message by their private key. Diffie-Hellman, RSA are ElGamal are some 
examples of well-regarded asymmetric encryption schema. 
Chapter 4: A Review of Methods to Secure Open MASs 
42 
 
Table  4-1. Examples of encryption and certificate based methods to securing MASs 
References Description Agent Platform 
Foner (1996) PGP-based solution using symmetric and public key 
encryption 
Yenta 
He et al. (1998) Security agents as certificate authorities (CAs) and 
public key cryptography 
KQML 
Wang et al. (1999) A lightweight asymmetric encryption scheme  - 
Wong & Sycara (1999) Unique agent IDs and SSL to provide agent 
communication security. 
Agent Certification Authority (ACA) to certify the binding 
of agents' ids to their public keys and DCA for deployer 
keys (for authentication) 
RETSINA 
Poslad & Calisti 
(2000) 
Symmetric and public key encryption and Simple Public 
Key Infrastructure for authentication 
FIPA model 
Karnik & Tripathi 
(2001) 
El-Gamal public key for encryption  (and a DSA public 
key for digital signatures). 
Signed certificates using the agent owner’s private key 
Ajanta 
Novak et al. (2003) Symmetric and public key encryption and Security 
Certification Authority (SCA) for authentication 
FIPA model 
Borselius and Mitchell  
(2003) 
XML encryption service to secure ACL messages using 
Open PGP 
FIPA model 
van 't Noordende et al. 
(2004) 
SSL encryption for agent communication and an encoded 
SHA-1 hash of a public RSA key called Self-certifying 
Identifier  (ScID) 
Mansion 
Park et al. (2006) ID-based cryptography and Local PKI - 
Vila et al. (2007) TLS/SSL for agent communication security. 
IMTPoverSSL certificates to provide confidentiality, data 
integrity and mutual authentication 
JADE-S 
van 't Noordende et al. 
(2009) 
Public key encryption and Self-certifying Identifiers 
(ScIDs) for end-to-end authentication 
Agent Operating 
System (AOS)  
 
  Broadly speaking, the two important problems of using symmetric cryptographic 
algorithms in open MASs are the need of a separate secret key for each pair (or group) of agents 
and sharing secret keys. The first problem may lead to a scaling hurdle for a large number of 
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agents and the second problem particularly affects symmetric cryptosystems in some open MAS, 
in which unknown agents appear and re-appear frequently. In other words, in open MASs with 
large (possibly unbounded) number of agents it seems impractical to allocate a separate 
encryption key for each pair of agents and manage them. The secret key is the security basis of 
symmetric encryption methods, because if it is discovered, all messages can be decrypted, so it 
should be protected securely. A common solution to these problems is combining a public key 
cryptography schema with the symmetric encryption which many, such as Foner (1996), Wong 
and Sycara (1999), and Borselius and Mitchell (2003) have done. 
Wong and Sycara (1999) have proposed a security infrastructure to address the security and 
trust of the RETSINA framework (Sycara, et al. 2003), a reusable multi-agent infrastructure, and 
provide solutions for secure communication, integrity of system level services (such as naming 
and matchmaking services) and accountability. They have used unique agent IDs and the Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL)1 protocol, beneath their agent communication layer, to provide agent 
communication security. Use of SSL encryption is based on the assumption that agents’ 
deployers have public and private keys binding their physical identities and they should be made 
responsible for the actions of their agents. The authors also suppose that ANSs2 and 
Matchmakers are trusted. In a different research with a similar approach, Vila et al. (2007) have 
introduced various security services for the JADE framework by integrating existing JADE-S 
security features into their own mechanism, IMTPoverSSL. IMTPoverSSL provides 
confidentiality, data integrity and mutual authentication using a certificate-based container-to-
container structure. In this framework, each container (group of agents) securely stores other 
containers' certificates and the above security features are provided using the TLS/SSL 
protocols. In both methods agent communication security relies on the security of TLS and SSL. 
Broadly speaking, relying on widely-used existing security mechanisms has two sides. The 
disadvantage is that various hackers from different communities (network, web, etc.) are able to 
exploit its vulnerabilities. In the case of TLS/SSL, there is a reported TLS Renegotiation attack 
(Ray 2009), in which an attacker may be able to tamper with messages3, and even in some 
                                                           
1 SSL and its successor, TLS (Transport Layer Security), run on layers beneath application protocols such as HTTP 
and SMTP and above the TCP transport protocol 
2 Agent Name Servers 
3 A plaintext injection attack against SSL and all current versions of TLS 
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situations might break the encryption, which is a man-in-the-middle attack. On the other hand, 
the positive points are: (1) implementation of security protocols is not the responsibility of MAS 
developers meaning that implementation security flaws will be avoided; (2) it is a feasible 
resolution in some open MAS where agent platforms are created by different authorities; (3) 
these mechanisms are widely used and tested, so they are more reliable; (4) corresponding 
organisations will eliminate security vulnerabilities e.g. for the TLS Renegotiation attack, IETF1 
suggested a solution (E. Rescorla Feb. 2010). 
Although using public key cryptography solves the problem of secret key management, 
authenticity and integrity of the other agents’ public keys are still an open question. The question 
is how an agent X can be confident that the claimed public key of agent Y belongs to Y and the 
key has not been tampered with or replaced by a malevolent agent. Generally, applying a public 
key cryptosystem without using an authentication mechanism may amount to man-in-the-middle 
attacks. Using a certificate-based schema i.e. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Web of Trust 
in Open-PGP (a defacto public key encryption system) are common solutions to this. Douceur 
(2002) proves that trusted certification is the only approach to prevent Sybil attack (or fake 
identity attacks in case of MASs) and without a logically centralised authority, there is no 
solution to Sybil attacks. 
The following are some examples of approaches using certificate-based encryption. 
• In (Foner 1996), in which the main concern is privacy, security issues of Yenta (a 
decentralised, p2p matchmaking agent) such as gathering other agents’ private data and 
discovering users’ profiles from their agents have been addressed. The author has 
implemented a security system to protect the integrity of MASs and has suggested a 
PGP-based solution using symmetric and asymmetric encryption for the agents’ 
communications. 
• He et al. (1998), have nominated autonomous agents, called security agents, as 
certificate authorities (CA) in PKI (instead of static hierarchy) to scheme an 
authentication foundation for MAS security, design scalable authentication systems and 
make certificate management customisation possible. They have suggested adding new 
                                                           
1 Internet Engineering Task Force 
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speech acts to KQML to publish various certificates including apply-certificate, issue 
certificate, renew-certificate, update-certificate and revoke-certificate. 
• Wong and Sycara (1999) have proposed a PKI-based solution for the RETSINA model 
of MAS. There are two certification authorities in their security infrastructure: Agent 
Certification Authority (ACA) for agent keys as a part of their security infrastructure and 
Deployer Key Certificates (DCA), a certification authority for deployer keys which lies 
outside their infrastructure. 
• Borselius and Mitchell (2003) have developed an approach for secure agent 
communication based on using Open PGP to encrypt and sign ACL
1
 messages. They 
have also recommended using the XML encryption service to secure ACL messages. 
• Novak et al. (2003) proposed the X-Security package to secure the agent communication 
layer of FIPA based agent systems. X-Security supplies a secure model for inter-
platform communication and agent activities even in the case of inaccessibility of a CA. 
A Security Certification Authority (SCA) is introduced as an independent agent who can 
renew, suspend and withdraw agents’ digital certificates. 
• Park et al. (2006) have proposed an algorithm to enhance the security of MASs in 
distributed computing environments through using ID-based Cryptography (ID-C) to 
solve the scalability problem of PKI in such a way that no infrastructure is necessary to 
authenticate public keys and manage directories to store certificates. They have 
suggested an ID-based threshold decryption method without key escrow
2
 providing a 
key recovery scheme and key update strategy for dynamic group membership. 
Unfortunately, using public key cryptography infrastructure, like PKI and Open PGP, does 
not completely solve the underlying problem of public key authenticity in open systems. In other 
words, correctly identifying the public key of the user (agent owner) and ensuring that this key 
belongs to the real one is still a problem. In an open system, in which there is no previously 
established contact to legally commit the agent owners, repudiation of the signature and keys is 
possible. A malicious user may also pretend to be a famous organisation so as to gain the 
                                                           
1Agent Communication Language 
2 In the key escrow schema, private keys are stored in an escrow for key recovery under certain circumstances by an 
authorized third party. 
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confidence of users in accepting its certificate. Furthermore, some general security challenges of 
using PKI are mentioned in (C. E. Schneier 2000). Additionally, in some applications of open 
MASs (for example in emergency response or crisis management), applying certificates, which 
requires pre-negotiation or physical contact between agent owners and the certificate authorities, 
may not be very helpful. Furthermore, almost all the proposed solutions using encryption and 
certificate-based methods have focused on securing agent communications in low level 
transactions, securing agent messages only at platform level, while the issue of security in MASs 
extends to higher levels of system architecture. 
A fundamental limitation of encryption-base techniques is that they may guarantee the 
origin, confidentiality and integrity of information, but not its behaviour. They just prevent 
information from being released, not from being propagated. 
Generally, cryptography and certificate-based solutions are suggested to prevent read and 
altering attacks, although openness in MASs might cause some difficulties in practice. 
Encryption of sensitive data and authentication are the first and most effective steps toward 
countering interception, unauthorised access to agents, provenance attacks and agent log 
modifications. To avoid interaction modification attacks, besides encryption, SSL, digital 
signatures (which are not content-aware) and integrity checking (e.g. based on SHA-1 and MD5) 
are also necessary. There is still more need to impede interaction modification attack by 
avoiding a single point of responsibility; not relying on just one (even trusted) agent information,  
which is the responsibility of the trust service in a MAS. To prevent agent modification attacks, 
employing encrypted function and other code security mechanisms are recommended.  As an 
additional level of protection, proof-carrying code (G. C. Necula 2002) is a promising technique 
to detect any modification in agent code. 
 
4.2.2 Policy-based Methods 
Policy-driven mechanisms have been applied widely in a variety of security applications. 
Security policies, as a prevention approach to secure MAS, can be used for access control, 
definition of acceptable behaviour or confidentiality in adversary environments. Some examples 
of these methods are shown in Table  4-2. 
Chapter 4: A Review of Methods to Secure Open MASs 
47 
 
Access control using security policy is quite common in computer systems and MASs are no 
exception. Wagner (1997) has shown how the database concept of multi-level security can be 
applied to inter-agent communication in order to protect confidential information. A knowledge 
system of MSL1 databases and some basic inter-agent communication rules have been defined. 
The communication rules implement security classifications and the MSL database assigns a 
security classification (e.g.: unclassified, confidential, secret and top secret) to all information 
items and allocates an authorisation policy to all users. The whole system then enables agents to 
comply with a defined security policy. 
In (Quillinan, et al. 2008), it is argued that well defined and easily configurable security 
policies better address the security of MAS. Several agent middleware systems provide access 
control architectures such as JADE-S, SeMoA and AgentScape. JADE-S supplies a style of 
decentralised access control that is not flexible enough to define default security policies. SeMoA 
has a centralised access control and does not allow users to define their own policies. 
AgentScape provides a hybrid access control method, a combination of centralised and 
decentralised policy enforcement. The architecture used in the AgentScape middleware uses 
Role Based Access Control2 (RBAC) and while it has a set of default security policies, it also 
allows users to customise them (Quillinan, et al. 2008). Vitabile et al. (2008) extended the 
JADE-S framework with strong user authentication, a reputation-based trust system and an 
access control mechanism based on policy files. In the proposed framework, FPGA biometric 
sensors provide secure and fast authentication of the agent owner in a MAS. 
 
  
                                                           
1Multi-level secure 
2Role-based Access Control or role-based security (Ferraiolo, Kuhn and Chandramouli 2007)  is a predominant 
access control mechanism, in which all access is through roles (collections of permissions). 
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Table  4-2. Examples of policy-based methods 
References Type Description 
(Wagner 1997) Access Control Use of multi-level security concept 
(Quillinan, et al. 2008) Access Control Role Based Access Control  
(Tekbacak, Tuglular and 
Dikenelli 2009) 
Access Control Decentralised ontology and XACML   
(Tan, Poslad and Xi 
2004) 
Definition of acceptable 
behaviour 
Profile-based reasoning  model (for dynamic 
security reconfiguration) 
(Vazquez-Salceda, et al. 
2003). 
Definition of acceptable 
behaviour 
Electronic institutions as police norms 
(Paruchuri, Tambe, et al. 
2006) 
Policy randomisation Linear and non-linear programming 
algorithms to randomise single-agent 
policies to avoid an agent’s action being 
easily predictable 
(Paruchuri, Pearce, et al. 
2009) 
Policy randomisation A non-linear program with non-convex 
constraints ensuring the communication 
constraints are met 
(Tekbacak, Tuglular and 
Dikenelli 2011) 
Role-based Policy A policy model for agents when ontologies 
in the environment can change 
 
Although access control is necessary in many systems, defining a suitable security policy, 
which does not cramp users and is not very open is non-trivial, especially when there are 
heterogeneous agent systems with different ontologies. Malicious agents may also exploit 
vulnerabilities in access governance systems by masquerading. A common issue in many access 
control mechanisms for MASs is that they are usually applied at the level of agent middleware 
and concern access to low-level objects (e.g. files and IP address). This could be considered a 
weakness, because they might not be able to detect high-level access violations (such as probing 
attacks and fake identity attacks).   
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In (Tekbacak, Tuglular and Dikenelli 2009), a decentralised ontology and XACML1-based 
access control architecture for MASs has been proposed. The agent domain ontology and access 
control parameters in the agent security ontology have been combined within a common 
XACML policy document that is used through different MAS applications through translation of 
XACML and OWL to description logic (DL) concepts. This formalisation using DL concepts 
allows defining and effectively implementing an array of policy analysis services and helps the 
verification of policies under a common point. One limitation of this approach is that it is not 
completely compatible with open MASs without further upgrades in their implementation and 
this is mainly because of the centralised architecture of this model. 
The second type of policy driven methods is more general than just controlling access to 
information and defines acceptable behaviour of the system. An example is (Tan, Poslad and Xi 
2004), in which Tan et al. have proposed a policy-based infrastructure for dynamic security 
reconfiguration in open and heterogeneous systems to address the end-to-end security 
interoperability problem. They have developed a profile-based reasoning model for a dynamic 
security reconfiguration system, which detects and analyses policy conflicts and the need for 
security reconfiguration and then resolve them at a meta-level without the changing underlying 
systems’ implementation. A similar approach may be used to detect attacks at run-time and 
automatically reconfigure the system for a suitable response. 
Definition of acceptable behaviour for an agent by means of electronic institution is another 
way of attack prevention in MAS. An electronic institution provides a set of rules that define 
what agents are permitted and forbidden to do and the consequences of their actions (M. Esteva, 
et al. 2004). An electronic institution, as a collection of norms implemented by security policies, 
can be devised as a framework to define police norms that guide, control and regulate behaviour 
of other agents in an open MAS (Vazquez-Salceda, et al. 2003). 
The third approach in policy-based methods utilises policy randomisation to prevent 
adversaries guessing the agents’ next actions (Paruchuri, Tambe, et al. 2006) and (Paruchuri, 
Pearce, et al. 2009). The worst-case assumptions here are; first, agents act in an adversarial 
environment which cannot be modelled (because there may be unseen adversaries whose actions 
and capabilities are unknown); second, the adversary can observe the agent's state; third, the 
adversary knows the agent policy; forth, there is no or limited communication among agents. 
                                                           
1XACML is a declarative access control policy language implemented in XML. 
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The authors have introduced a randomised policy making to avoid an agent’s action being easily 
predictable, using a decision-theoretic model based on the Multi-agent Constrained Markov 
Decision Problem (MCMDP). 
Paruchuri et al. (2006) have provided three linear and non-linear programming algorithms, 
to randomise single-agent policies. They also have implemented a new algorithm, Rolling Down 
Randomisation (RDR), which efficiently generates randomised policies via the single-agent 
linear programming method. With similar assumptions in their prior work, the authors in 
(Paruchuri, Pearce, et al. 2009), have developed a non-linear program with non-convex 
constraints that randomises agent team policies while ensuring that the communication 
constraints of the team are met and the miscoordination arising due to randomised policies is 
countered.  
Although preventing adversaries from guessing an agent’s next actions can be useful in 
some applications, in open MAS with shared interaction models, we might not always be 
interested in randomised behaviour with all peers. In scenarios where we can group the 
counterpart agents into trusted and untrusted, the policy randomisation will be a countermeasure 
against untrusted agents.  
Loulou et al. (2007) have proposed a formal approach to prevent attacks on MASs by 
verifying security policies. They proved theorems describing in which circumstances security 
policies are successful and could overcome a given kind of attack on mobile agents. They used 
Z-Eves tools for type checking and theorem proving. In a different study on credential-based 
authorisation policies, Becker (2010) has introduced a formal framework to analyse secrecy of 
policy languages. Becker redefined two information flow properties (non-interference and 
detectability) in credential systems and proposed an inference system that informs us what an 
adversary can detect from our system. Although his work is not directly related to MASs, his 
formal approach can be used to protect MASs against probing attacks (Bijani, Robertson and 
Aspinall 2011). 
The security policy approach, especially using low-level and high-level access control 
methods, can help the prevention of read attacks (interception, unauthorised access to agents, 
provenance attack). Defining acceptable behaviour (e.g. limit the number of queries from one 
agent) can assist counter denial of service and ontology attacks. 
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Generally, access control mechanisms on their own are insufficient to ensure the secrecy of 
computational systems, because they cannot prevent the propagation of confidential information 
after it has been released. 
 
4.2.3 Secure Agent Development 
Considering security concerns during the development and implementation of MASs is another 
method to prevent security threats. To fulfil this goal, we consider two approaches: agent-
oriented software engineering and language-based security for agents. 
 
4.2.3.1 Agent-oriented Software Engineering 
Adding security to agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE) has become an important area 
within the agent research community (Mouratidis, Giorgini and Manson 2003). (Liu, Yu and 
Mylopoulos 2002) and (Yu and Cysneiros 2002) are examples of addressing security issues 
within the requirements engineering process and (Mouratidis and Giorgini 2009), (Xiao 2009) 
and (Rojas and Mahdy 2011) are examples of integrating security throughout the agent 
development process (Table  4-3). We can also benefit from UML extensions as generic tools for 
secure software development e.g. UMLsec (Jurjens 2002) that incorporate security requirement 
analysis in software design. 
Many efforts have been made to provide appropriate methods for integrating functional 
requirements and non-functional security requirements during the whole software development 
stages using Tropos, an agent-oriented software development methodology (Bresciani, Perini, et 
al. 2004); e.g. (Mouratidis, Giorgini and Manson 2003), (Mouratidis 2007), (Mouratidis and 
Giorgini 2009), (Massacci, Mylopoulos and Zannone 2010). Mouratidis et al. (2003) have 
extended Tropos by adding security concepts into the design methodology, with concepts such 
as Security Diagrams, Security Constraints, Secure Entities and Secure Capabilities, that enable 
MAS developers to describe security requirements. They illustrate their new methodology using 
a case study from the health care sector. In (Bresciani, Giorgini, et al. 2004) the degree of 
criticality and complexity of the parts of the agent system has been analysed to identify possible 
security bottlenecks of the system. This analysis facilitates decision making of agent system 
developers, about probable trade-offs between functional requirements and security. The authors 
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also have suggested an algorithm to reduce the complexity or criticality of the security 
requirement analysis process. Other efforts to suggest a methodology for integrating functional 
and security requirements in Tropos are (Mouratidis, Giorgini and Weiss 2003), (Mouratidis and 
Giorgini 2009) and (Rojas and Mahdy 2011). Massacci et al. (2010) have proposed the use of 
Secure Tropos methodology with SI*, a modelling language to deal with security and trust. 
Their goal was to derive privacy policies from requirements to bridge the gap between policy 
specification and requirements analysis. 
Xiao (Xiao 2009) has merged the concept of agent role in AOSE and in Role Based Access 
Control to produce a model-driven architecture for building adaptive and secure MAS. The idea 
is that interaction models, containing the agent’s role, obligations and security policy rules, 
which define constraints derived from agent social roles, identify rights of agent. Therefore, 
functional requirements and security constraints are connected by the notion of role. This 
method aims to deal with a complete MAS development process from requirements analysis and 
the early design phase to the implementation phase. The proposed methodology is compatible 
with open multi-agent systems. 
Xiao et al (2008) have proposed multilevel secure LCC interaction models for health care 
multi-agent systems. A security architecture for the HealthAgents system and a security policy 
set using LCC have been suggested in (Xiao, Lewis and Dasmahapatra 2008). Hu et al. (2009) 
have also developed a system to support data integration and decision making in the breast 
cancer domain using LCC and briefly addressed some security issues. They have all used 
constraints and message passing in LCC interaction models to implement security solutions for 
access control and secure data transfer, but they have not addressed confidentiality issues such as 
information leakage. 
 
Table  4-3. Examples of adding security to agent-oriented software engineering 
References Phase Description 
(Liu, Yu and 
Mylopoulos 2002) 
Requirements engineering  Modelling of relationships among strategic 
actors in order to extract, identify and analyse 
security requirements 
(Yu and Cysneiros 
2002) 
Requirements engineering A framework to model the way agents interact 
to achieve privacy 






Throughout the development 
process 
Adds security concepts into the design 
methodology in Tropos 
(Bresciani, 
Giorgini, et al. 
2004) 
Requirements engineering An algorithm to reduce the complexity or 
criticality of security requirement analysis 
(Mouratidis and 
Giorgini 2009) 
Throughout the development 
process 
A methodology for integrating functional and 






Throughout the development 
process 
A model-driven architecture by merging the 





Requirements engineering An attempt to bridge the gap between policy 
specification and requirements analysis by 
deriving privacy policies from requirements 
(Rojas and Mahdy 
2011) 
Throughout the development 
process 
An extension to Tropos methodology by 
integrating threat modelling in software 
application development 
 
Attack modelling, during the design phase, allows software engineers to clearly understand 
and analyse design flaws and mitigate security vulnerabilities. As a result, various security attack 
modelling techniques and tools have been introduced in the computer security literature. We 
could name attack trees (B. Schneier 1999), attack graphs (Lippmann and Ingols 2005), 
statecharts (El Ariss and Xu 2011) and Petri Net-based attack nets (McDermott 2000) as a few of 
these techniques. These techniques can also be customised and applied to agent-oriented 
software engineering to prevent known attacks on open MASs. For example in (Rojas and 
Mahdy 2011), the Tropos methodology is extended by integrating threat modelling in software 
application development.   
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4.2.3.2 Language-based Security 
Access control is insufficient for the secrecy of computational systems because it does not 
prevent the propagation of confidential information and is not suitable for encrypted 
information. Encryption and digital signature also cannot prevent attacks that exploit 
information flow (e.g. injection attack). Information flow analysis is a complement to those 
approaches to ensure some security properties hold. 
Using information flow theory for software security analysis is an old idea e.g. by tagging 
confidential data and analysing tagged data propagation (D. E. Denning 1976). Sabelfeld and 
Myers (2003) argue, in their survey of language-based information flow security, that sound type 
systems could be a promising language-based technique to specify and enforce an information 
flow policy. 
Two lines of work on static program certification initiated by Denning (1976) and security 
specification by Cohen (1977) are merged and pursued by Volpano and Smith (1997) proposing 
a security type system that enforces security specifications. In recent years, there has been a 
great deal of research into secure information flow analysis. Type-based secrecy has been 
studied in the context of imperative programming languages e.g. (Heintze and Riecke 1998), 
functional programming e.g. (Austin, Flanagan and Abadi 2012) and process calculi e.g. 
(Honda, Vasconcelos and Yoshida 2000) and (Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld 2005). 
There are two approaches to analysing information flow security: static and dynamic (run-
time) analysis. Static techniques prove program correctness with reasonable computation cost, 
conservatively detect implicit and explicit information flows and provide stronger security 
assurance than the dynamic techniques (Sabelfeld and Myers 2003). 
Information flow techniques can also be applied to MAS. Halpern and O’Neil (2008) 
provided a general framework for analysing the secrecy of MASs that can handle probability and 
non-determinism in synchronous or asynchronous systems. In their approach, a logic that 
includes modal operators for reasoning about knowledge and probability is used to syntactically 
characterise secrecy. However their approach is very abstract and theoretical and needs 
adaptation and redefinition of security properties for any MAS. 
To avoid active probing and injection attacks in an open MAS, we advocate the 
implementation of static and dynamic language-based security systems that use security types to 
prevent information leakage. For this purpose, the agent needs to be implemented by a language 
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that supports information flow analysis. Not much research has been done on applying language-
based security techniques to agent development languages. We will discuss this approach in 
Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 in detail. 
 
4.3 Detection Approach 
Although prevention methods usually take precedence over detection methods, it is not always 
possible or feasible to impede all kind of attacks. In practice, there is a continual battle between 
defenders and attackers struggling to break the security defences. Hence, the design and 
implementation of powerful detection and response mechanisms against possible attacks as a 
second stage of defence are essential. In the detection approach, the sooner an attack is detected, 
the less the impact of the attack on the victim agents would be. In the case of open MAS, in 
which there is a minimum guarantee about the agent’s identity and behaviour, detection seems to 
be at least as important as prevention. 
 
4.3.1 Monitoring 
Monitoring is a general method of attack detection in hostile environments. The goal of 
monitoring-based techniques in an open MAS is to detect the misbehaviour of agents or to find 
anomalies in the system. For misbehaviour detection, we need to define the specifications of 
agent communication protocol in order to detect interactions that exploit it. As agent 
communications do not follow a common consented standard, misbehaviour should be defined 
separately for each type of MAS. 
In the anomaly detection approach, patterns in data that do not conform to the expected 
behaviour are detected (Chandola, Banerjee and Kumar 2009).  Classification, clustering or 
statistical methods are a few examples of anomaly detection techniques that can be applied in 
open MASs for attack detection. Anomalies are detected when the current MAS state differs 
from the trained model (classifier). The openness in open MASs might hinder successful 
anomaly detection.  Openness in the sense that new agents can freely join the system is not a 
problem, but when the open MAS allows new component to be added to the system at run-time, 
e.g. the OpenKnowledge system (Robertson, Giunchiglia, et al. 2008), this leads to a dynamic 
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behaviour that resists anomaly detection. In these more dynamic systems, anomaly detection 
techniques generate many false positives rendering the techniques ineffective. 
We will now discuss peer monitoring, information monitoring and policy monitoring as 
three misbehaviour detection monitoring techniques and activity monitoring as an anomaly 
detection technique. 
 
4.3.1.1 Peer Monitoring 
Page et al. (2005) have extended their previous research on the Buddy model to a more general 
security mechanism for mobile agent systems. This model adds a separate security layer to the 
agents’ business functionality. In the proposed centralised system, agents who monitor others are 
called Buddy and the others who are monitored are called protected agents (PA). A PA might 
also be Buddy of another PA. There are three basic rules ensuring the uniformity of the model:  
first, each PA has two Buddy agents; second, PA and Buddy agents must never be the same; and 
three, an agent can be a Buddy of only one protected agent. The home base host manage security 
of the whole MAS and in case of any malicious activity; it receives alerts from the monitoring 
system. 
While the Buddy model has been designed for mobile agents, with minor changes it can be 
applied to non-mobile agent systems as well. The centralised nature of this model may be a 
limitation for scalability of open multi-agent systems, although use of local monitoring 
subsystems may overcome this shortcoming. 
 
4.3.1.2 Information Monitoring 
Monitoring published information in agent communications and keeping track of transferred 
messages facilitate the detection of some information-centred attacks: provenance, active 
probing and ontology attacks. For example, in the case of the ontology attack, monitoring users’ 
queries to the ontology and defining some thresholds for the number and the scope of the queries 
may impede the attack. The information monitoring technique helps us to at least find what other 
agents (adversaries) have already found out about the agents and be more cautious in future 
communication with the suspected agents.  
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4.3.1.3 Policy Monitoring 
Implementing agents on top of web services has been introduced as a potential market for agent 
systems and as approach to make them more popular (Petrie and Bussler 2003) and (Xiao 2009), 
so security solutions from the Web Service community may be helpful in open MAS. Clark et al. 
(2010) have introduced a framework for secure monitoring of a specific Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) and have implemented it in AgentScape system. The authors have modified 
WS-Agreement, an SLA specification for establishing agreement between parties in Web 
Services, for effective monitoring. They have designed a model for secure and reliable violation 
monitoring of SLAs and a method for specifying violation policies in a hostile environment. A 
centralised and a decentralised monitoring of contraventions were tested and the results showed 
slightly better performance in the decentralised version.  As an intrusion can be considered a 
kind of violation, this system might also be applied to detect attacks, at least for those attacks for 
which we could specify their features. 
 
4.3.1.4 Activity Monitoring 
Activity monitoring is similar to the concept of activity profiling (Carl, et al. 2006) to detect the 
denial of service attacks in computer network literature. This is based on the calculation of the 
average traffic rate for the whole interaction between two agents. Each agent can measure the 
average traffic rate and whenever any counterpart agent behaves very differently, it can react by 
raising an alarm, decreasing the rank of that agent or filtering possible malicious agent. In a 
MAS with centralised management approach, the total MAS communication activities and the 
average rate of all inbound and outbound flows can be measured and be used to detect suspicious 
communications. To avoid the high-dimensionality problem1, a MAS can be clustered into 
different classes, each of which has a monitoring agent.  
To detect DoS and DDoS attacks, especially flooding attacks, change-point detection 
methods and wavelet analysis of agent traffic are recommended (Carl, et al. 2006). We can also 
employ existing anomaly detection techniques; i.e. Classification Based, Clustering Based, 
                                                           
1 If each communication activity is considered as an attribute (a dimension), analysing all MAS communication flows 
will be a high-dimensional problem that often leads to large-scale computations. 
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Nearest-Neighbour-Based, Statistical, Information-Theoretic and Spectral techniques (Chandola, 
Banerjee and Kumar 2009).  
 
4.3.2 Attack Modelling 
Modelling attacks or attackers is a useful technique to detect some attacks on MASs. In the 
security literature one can find several formal/informal attack(er) modelling strategies for 
different purposes. Security modelling, in general, is an approach to analyse various aspects of 
security (e.g. confidentiality and integrity) in a system. While security modelling is more likely 
to be categorised as a prevention method (such as a number of attack modelling techniques in 
section  4.2.3.1), online modelling can also be considered as a detection appraoch. 
In the following sub-sections, two attack modelling approaches to attack detection in open 
MASs are introduced: coordination graphs and statistical modelling.   
 
4.3.2.1 Coordination Graphs 
Given that some attacks on agent systems are taking advantage of social behaviour between 
attackers, Braynov and Jadliwala (2004) have studied detection of coordinated attacks on MAS. 
A group of attacker agents may collude to stage a large attack on the victim agent system by 
dividing the tasks into separate subtasks among themselves. Conventional intrusion detection 
systems just detect the last section of the attack chain, not the attacker assistants who prepare 
attack prerequisites. Assuming that there is a security mechanism to detect a single malicious 
action, the authors have defined formal metrics on the coordination graph to discover main and 
peripheral attacker agents. They have introduced a formal model of distributed monitoring and a 
formal method and an algorithm to detect maximal malicious group of attackers using a 
coordination graph (nodes are states and arcs are attacks) of all users.  
The proposed methods can be applied to detect attacks at an early stage and is capable of 
being used online (for attack detection) or offline (for forensic analysis). The suggested method 
is a useful defence against many coordinated attacks, but the assumption that every single 
malicious action can be detected may not be valid in some attacks, such as an ontology attack, so 
it may not be appropriate for them. 
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Dove (2009) has proposed a platform for unmanned autonomous system testing (UAST) 
based on a socially aware team of autonomous agents. His platform can be merged with the 
attack detection method of Braynov and Jadliwala (2004) to employ socially aware security 
agents as a community watch in an open MAS. Both methods can be used to detect coordinated 
attacks such as distributed denial of service. 
Khan et al. (2009) have taken a different approach and have suggested a technique that 
models malicious hosts behaviour against mobile agents. They have also proposed the Mobile 
Agent Graph Head Sealing (MAGHS) method to grantee the integrity of mobile agent system. 
MAGHS uses symmetric encryption algorithms with a shared secret key between every host and 
the home platform. It is assumed that a dynamic data structure like a graph can represent the 
resultant of mobile agents’ execution on a host. The attacker behaviour is modelled as a time 
function, in which long time means unsuccessful attack, and in the case of any possible 
modification in the agent state, it can be detected by the agent owner. MAGHS is a solution to 
truncation and repudiation attacks in mobile agent systems. 
 
4.3.2.2 Statistical Modelling 
Statistical modelling is another approach, in which anomaly of an open MAS can be detected. In 
statistical anomaly detection techniques, it is assumed that anomalies occur in the low 
probability regions of the stochastic model (Chandola, Banerjee and Kumar 2009). There are 
two types of statistical anomaly modelling: (1) parametric techniques such as the Gaussian 
model (Aggarwal and Yu 2008) or regression model methods (Kadota, et al. 2003) and (2) non-
parametric techniques such as histogram-based methods e.g. (Dasgupta and Majumdar 2002).  
In both modelling techniques, a statistical model of the training data is generated and a 
statistical test is applied to the new data set. Anomalies are the resultant instances with low 
probability. Parametric techniques assume an underlying distribution in the statistical 
population, while non-parametric techniques do not assume any distribution and the number and 
nature of the parameters are not fixed in advance. These anomaly detection methods can be used 
to detect some probing attacks, ontology attacks and denial of service attacks on open MAS. A 
disadvantage of statistical techniques is the assumption that the data is generated from a 
particular distribution and it often does not hold for high-dimensional real data sets (Chandola, 
Banerjee and Kumar 2009). 





In this chapter, we have reviewed and categorised security solutions intended to provide security 
in MASs and have suggested some solutions from network security literature as 
countermeasures to attacks against open MASs. The presented security solutions can be divided 
into prevention and detection approaches; Encryption and certification, policy-based methods 
and secure agent development are three prevention mechanisms, and monitoring and modelling 
are two detection approaches. Some of the presented security techniques did not aim at securing 
open MASs or even MASs, but they were found to be applicable to open MASs. 
To illustrate links between various techniques a visual summary of security approaches in 
the literature proposed to secure MASs is provided as a chronological tree in Fig. 4-1. This might 
not be a comprehensive phylogenetic tree but it shows key relations amongst different 
approaches from 1995 to 2012. This does not include approaches to security issues that are 
specific to the mobility of mobile agents; i.e. threats from mobile agent to platforms and from 
the platforms to agents. 
  






















Thirunavukkarasu et al (1995) 
         Foner (1996)  
 
 He et al. (1998) 
Wong & Sycara (1999) Wang et. al (1999) 
Poslad & Calisti (2000)    Jansen & Karygiannis (2000) 
 
Finin et. al (2002)      Liuet al. (2002) 
      Novak  (2003) Borselius & Mitchell (2003)   Mouratidis et. al (2003) 
Zaslavsky (2004)       Braynov & Jadliwala (2004)        Bresciani et. al (2004) 
Page et. al (2005) 
Park et al. (2006)  Paruchuri et al. (2006)  
Vila et al. (2007)    Loulou et al. (2007)   Mouratidis (2007) 
    Quillinan et al. (2008)   Beydoun et al (2009) 
Noordende et al. (2009)  Paruchuri et al. (2009) Dove (2009)    Xiao (2009)      Mouratidis (2009) 
Botelho (2009)             Clark et al (2010)          Massacci et al. (2010) 
Sun & Chen (2011)  Tekbacak et al. (2011)   Rojas & Mahdy (2011) 
Fig. 4-1: Chronological order of proposed security approaches to secure MASs. ‘E&C’ 
means encryption and certificate-based methods, ‘Po’ is policy-based methods, ‘SAD’ 
stands for secure agent development, ‘Mon’ is for monitoring approach and ‘Md’ 
means modelling technique. 
The proposed appropriate security techniques for each attack category are summarised in 
Table  4-4. In this table,  indicates an effective and feasible security technique to counter an 
attack, which is strongly recommended, although it may not completely solve the problem.  
means that the attack cannot be prevented or detected with the specified security countermeasure 
and  shows that the security technique does not solve the problem, but helps us make the attack 
harder or discourage attackers. The feasibility and effectiveness of suggested solutions are 
imprecise because of variations in security sub-techniques and their dependency on the 
application and implementation of the open MAS. For example, variety access-control 





Noordende et al. (2004) 
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Table  4-4, it is assumed that the most effective mechanism will be used to countermeasure each 
attack. 
Table  4-4: Summary of security mechanisms to countermeasure different attacks on open MASs 
 Prevention Detection 


























































































































































































 Interception           
Access to agents           








Ontology attack           
Active probing 
 









          
Agent code 
modification 
          
Agent log 
modification 







Message injection           
Knowledge 
injection 








Link flooding           





Logical DoS           







 Fake agents           
Fake services           
Reputation attack           
 
In this thesis, hereafter, the term security refers to confidentiality and secrecy, unless 
otherwise stated. The next chapter deals with information leakage problem in open MASs.  






5. Information Leakage in Agent Interactions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Information leakage denotes disclosure of secret information to unauthorised parties via insecure 
information flows. Information leaks in agent interactions occur when secret data are revealed 
through message transfers, constraints or assigning roles to agents. Revealing information may 
also help an adversary learn about the MAS and form a plan of attack. 
Common security techniques such as conventional access control, encryption, digital 
signatures, virus signature detection and information filtering are necessary but they do not 
address the fundamental problem of tracking information flow in information systems, therefore, 
they cannot prevent all information leaks. Access control mechanisms only prevent illegal access 
to information resources and cannot be a substitute for information flow control (Sabelfeld and 
Myers 2003). Encryption-based techniques guarantee the origin and integrity of information, but 
not its behaviour.  
In this chapter, different types of insecure information flows in open MAS governed by LCC 
interaction models are introduced. Then, two approaches to avoid information leaks through 
insecure flows are proposed. 
 
5.2 Security Levels 
The first step in secure information flow analysis for LCC interaction models is defining security 
levels for LCC terms and components. A set of security levels is a finite lattice i.e. a partially 
ordered set with a top element H and a bottom element L, ordered by ≤. Lower in the lattice 
denotes “less secure” and higher in the lattice indicates “more secure”. Without loss of 
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generality, a two-element security lattice is assumed with levels l, for low security (public 
information), and h, for high security (secret information). The following definition characterises 
the concept of security levels in this thesis.  
 
Definition  5-1 (Security Levels): 
We consider a simple lattice L with two security levels, low l and high h, security level l ∈ (L, ≤), 
where l ≤ h and ≤ is a partial order relation.  
 
We need to ensure that information flows only upwards in the lattice (D. E. Denning 1976) 
e.g. when l ≤ h, permissible information flows are from l to l, from l to h and from h to h, but 
flow from h to l is not allowed.   
 
5.3 Insecure Information Flows  
A MAS keeps secrets confidential during agents’ interaction if it only allows secure information 
flow. There are two types of information flows: explicit flow and implicit flow. Distinctions 
between explicit and implicit flows in LCC interaction models are shown with the following 
examples. It is assumed that all the LCC terms in the given examples are public information 
(which have security level l ), except for the following secret variables (which have security 
level h ) 
SecretMessage, SecretID, S, PrivateAgent, secretAgent. 
 
5.3.1 Explicit flows 
Insecure explicit information flow denotes direct sending or assigning of secrets. Explicit flows 
in LCC interaction models may occur in three situations: (a) message passing, (b) invoking a 
constraint and (c) assigning a role to an agent. In explicit information flows, the operations are 
performed independently of the value of their terms (Denning and Denning 1977), e.g. the 
content of an LCC message does not affect the sending operation. Insecure explicit flow may 
cause secret information to be leaked to a publicly observable term. Consider the following LCC 
codes as examples of explicit information flows: 




a) Message passing 
The following explicit flow, in which the instance of a variable SecretMessage is sent 
to a low level agent P with the risk of secret information leakage: 
SecretMessage => a(publicAgent, P)   
The secret message can also be received by another agent: 
SecretMessage <= a(publicAgent, P) 
This breach of security can occur in an LCC clause, when a public agent P sends the 
SecretMessage to any (public or secret) receiver agent R: 
a(publicAgent, P):: 
... 
SecretMessage => a(receiver, R) 
...  
On the other hand, a message passing pattern can occur without a security breach. 
The following explicit flows that sends (receives) a PublicMessage variable to (from) a 
secretAgent S is permissible. 
PublicMessage => a(secretAgent, S) 
and 
PublicMessage <= a(secretAgent, S) 
 
b) Invoking a constraint 
An example of an explicit flow that discloses the value of a secret variable to a publicly 
observed variable is assigning SecretID to a PublicVariable in an LCC constraint:  
null <- assign(PublicVariable, SecretID) 
Any constraint that updates the value of a public term using a secret term causes an 
unacceptable information flow. The constraints in LCC play an important role, although 
the implementation details of constraint solvers are invisible to LCC clauses and the 
constraint solver might even be a remote web service. However, it is the responsibility 
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of the LCC programmer to prevent any illegal information flow caused by invoking a 
constraint.   
 
c) Assigning a role to an agent 
When a role is assigned to an agent in the definition of an LCC clause, the security level 
of the role and the agent identifier need to be compatible. The following role definition 
is not a permissible flow, because it assigns a secret role secretAgent to a low security 
agent PublicAgent.   
a(secretAgent, PublicAgent)::  
  ... 
On the other hand, a publicAgent role (or a secretAgent role) can be assigned to a 
PrivateAgent: 
a(publicAgent, PrivateAgent)::   ... 
 
5.3.2 Implicit Flows 
Insecure implicit flows disclose some information through the program control flow. In other 
words, based on a definition from Denning and Denning (1977), we can define an implicit 
information flow from term T1 to term T2, when a performed operation causes a flow from 
some arbitrary T3 to T2, based on the value of T1. Thus, conditional LCC expressions are the 
sources of insecure flows. 
The following example is a conditional statement, in which a public message is sent to a 
public agent P, if the constraint is satisfied (SecretID ≤ 10). The explicit flow in sending the 
message is permitted, but the implicit flow from the constraint to the public agent P that leaks 
information about the range of SecretID variable is illegal. If a public message is sent to agent 
P, it reveals that the SecretID is less than or equal to 10 and if it is not sent, the SecretID is 
greater than 10.  
PublicMessage => a(publicAgent,P) <- lessOrEqual(SecretID, 10) 
In another example below, the public agent P can guess the range of SecretID, by receiving 
a public message containing a public variable X, although the message passing part does not 
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explicitly disclose any information. Either the public agent receives publicMsg(X) or 
publicMsg(1), knowing the value of X, some information about SecretID is leaked.    
publicMsg(X) => a(publicAgent,P) <- lessOrEqual(SecretID,X) 
or 
publicMsg(1) => a(publicAgent,P) 
 
The above example might leak information about SecretID, but not the exact value of it. 
The following example discloses the value of SecretID; assuming SecretID is not negative, the 
initial value of X is set to 0 and the constraint increase(X1,X,1) means X1=X+1. In the recursive 
clause below, if SecretID is not equal to 0, the value of X1 is X+1 and the clause is called again 
with the updated X1; i.e. a(myAgent(X1),Q). Finally, when X equals to SecretID+1, 
publicMsg(X) reveals the value of SecretID to the public agent P. 
a(myAgent1(X), Q):: ... 
( 
   a(myAgent1(X1), Q) <- lessOrEqual(SecretID,X) ∧ increase(X1,X,1)  
   or 
   publicMsg(X)=>a(publicAgent,P)        % when X equals SecretID +1 
 ) 
In a similar example, the following LCC clause binds R to the precise value of SecretID if 
the role completes successfully. So, it discloses the value of SecretID to the public agent P by 
sending publicMsg(R) message. In this example, even if R is not sent as a message parameter 
(i.e. publicMsg instead of publicMsg(R)), the public agent P can discover the value of 





   publicMsg(R)=>a(publicAgent,P) <- lessOrEqual(SecretID,X) ∧ increase(X1,X,1)  
   then a(myAgent2(X1,R), Q)  
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 )  or 
   a(myAgent2(X,X), Q) <- equals(SecretID,X)  
  
Information may leak because of the termination behaviour of the interaction model1. 
Recursion is the key to this type of leaks. In the following sample LCC clause, the adversary 
learns that the value of the SecretID is 0 if the interaction model terminates. 
a(myAgent3, Q):: 
   a(myAgent3, Q) <- ¬equals(SecretID,0)  
 
Adversaries can exploit explicit or implicit information flows to perform attacks such as the 
illustrated examples of interception and probing attacks in Chapter 3. We need to prevent both 
explicit and implicit insecure information flows in order to ensure no information leaks to 
unauthorised parties.   
 
5.3.3 Summary 
Table  5-1 to Table  5-3 summarise the acceptable and unacceptable explicit and implicit 
information flows in message passing, role assignment and conditional statements in LCC codes. 
It is assumed that a secret LCC term and a public LCC term are shown by h and l, respectively.  
In Table  5-1, permissible and impermissible information flows in sending a message, based 
on the security levels of the sender, the receiver and the message are shown. The three 
undesirable flows are: 1) sending a high security message by a low security sender to a low 
security receiver, 2) sending a high security message by a low security sender to a high security 




                                                           
1 This is also called information leaks via the termination channel. 
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Table  5-1. Permissible and impermissible information flows in sending a message 
based on the security levels of the sender, the receiver and the message   
Sender Receiver Message Permissible Flow 
L L L Yes 
L L H No 
L H L Yes 
L H H No 
H L L Yes 
H L H No 
H H L Yes 
H H H Yes 
 
Table  5-2 shows different combinations of role allocation (without arguments) to agent 
identifiers, in which the only illegal flow is from a high security role to a low security agent. 
 
 
 Table  5-2. Permissible information flows in the LCC role definition regarding the 
security levels of the role and the agent identifier   
Agent Identifier Role Permissible Flow 
L L Yes 
L H No 
H L Yes 
H H Yes 
 
The sources of implicit information flows are conditional operations. Table  5-3 summarises 
secure and insecure information flows in LCC via conditional expressions in the form of 
(Operation1 <- Constraint) or Operation2. There is one generic insecure flow from 
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constraints to operations, when the operation is public but the constraint is secret. In Table  5-3, 
Max_Operation is the maximum security level of Operation1 and Operation2.  
 
Table  5-3. Permissible and impermissible information flows in LCC conditional 
expressions regarding the security levels of the operations and the constraint. 
Max_Operation = max (Operation1 level, Operation2 level). 
Constraint Max_Operation Permissible Flow 
L L Yes 
L H Yes 
H L No 
H H Yes 
 
The next section suggests countermeasures against insecure information leakage in LCC 
interaction models. It worth noting that, depending on the attack scenario or the type of the 
vulnerability, we sometimes investigate the whole interaction model and sometimes analyse a 
few clauses within it. 
   
5.4 Solutions 
Two approaches to address information flow problems in MASs governed by LCC interaction 
models are conceptual modelling by analysing the abstract models of LCC code and language-
based information flow analysis. In the first approach, an LCC interaction model is translated 
into an abstract model, in which information leakage is investigated using an existing reasoning 
tool. In language-based analysis of LCC code, we employ security types for LCC terms and 
enforce a security policy by type checking. 
 
Chapter 5: Information Leakage in Agent Interactions 
71 
 
5.4.1 Conceptual Modelling 
In conceptual modelling, the idea is to convert LCC interaction models into another 
formalisation (e.g. pi-calculus or propositional logic) and use an existing information leakage 
analysis tool for the new representation (e.g. Counterdog1, Secure Session2, etc.).  
In (Bijani, Robertson and Aspinall 2011), we have suggested a framework to detect active 
probing attacks that use electronic institutions to attack MASs. Although this example does not 
address all the information flow problems directly, it can describe the three main steps to 
conceptual modelling illustrated in Fig.  5-1. We have used conceptual representation to 
formulate LCC interaction models into a logical form and employed Counterdog as the analysis 
tool. In active probing attacks, a malicious interaction model designed by an adversary is 
deployed on a MAS. The adversary might then infer confidential facts about the agents by 
analysing the results of smart queries during interactions.  
 
 




The first step in analysing the secrecy of an LCC interaction model is defining the security 
policy through adding security labels to LCC terms. In the original LCC syntax there are no 
means of assigning security levels to information. Variables, constants and constraints are 
ultimately the most elementary causes of the described information leaks, so when we receive 
(e.g. download) an LCC interaction model, we need to annotate it to reflect the confidentiality 
level of the information.  
                                                          
1 Becker, et al., Foundations of Trust Management (2012). 










an LCC interaction 
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We define the following annotation format:  
label(Term, Level). 
in which label is a keyword,  Term  is any LCC term and Level is the security label (e.g. 
Fig.  5-2 (b)). Without loss of generality, security labels are defined as having two levels: high 
(h) or low (l). l Means low security or public information and h means high security or secret 
information. The default security level for a term without a label would be high security.  
 
Definition  5-2 (Security Environment): 
A security environment Π is a finite map from LCC terms to security levels and is defined by 
Π		::=		empty		|	Π,	T:	9l,	h;,     ( 5-1) 
in which Π is empty (with no binding) or an updated environment that contains a mapping of the 
LCC term T to the level l or h.	 	As defined in section  2.3, an LCC term is either a constant, a 
variable or a structured Prolog term. 
 
5.4.1.2 Abstraction 
The next step in the security analysis is converting the annotated interaction models to simpler 
logical representations, which we call the conceptual representation, in order to identify only 
those parts of the LCC code related to the secrecy evaluation. In this conceptual representation, a 
more minimal interpretation of LCC code is represented, which reflects information leaks or 
helps to find information leakage. The conceptual representation may vary in different 
applications and scenarios. Hence, we cannot define a general-purpose conceptual representation 
that reflects all information leakages and can be perform automatically without need of manual 
supervision. 
As an example, for the detection of active probing attacks, in (Bijani, Robertson and 
Aspinall 2011) we define the following conceptual representation: the then operator in LCC is 
translated in this case to a logical conjunction. That is because we use non-temporal logic and 
we ignore the effect of the actions’ sequence on the information inferred by the adversary. LCC 
constraints are interpreted as queries or injections from the counterpart agent (an adversary). 
Hence the conditional operator (<-) is used only to find queries and injections and it does not 
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appear in the representation. The sent message in the left of <- (if one exists), could be an 
answer to the query. The received message’s parameters are also considered as new information 
for the receiver agent. We can legitimately interpret LCC interaction models in this way because 
we are not defining the semantics of the LCC specification but, instead, we are describing 
information that can be inferred to be true, as the result of our analysis. The abstractions of three 
simple LCC clauses are illustrated in Fig.  5-2(c). 
 




Fig.  5-2: An example of interaction modelling using the Counterdog tool to detect 
potential information leakage in an active probing attack. Finally, it shows that an 
adversary could infer that secret holds. 
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a(victim3, V)::  
  null <-( ¬fact1() ∨ fact2() ) then  
  null <- ( ¬secret() ∨ fact1() )then    
  ( ok => a(attacker, A) <- decide() 
  or 
   notOk => a(attacker, A) 
  ) 
  Clause 2  
a(victim2, V):: 
  null <- fact2() then  
  ( ok => a(attacker, A) <- decide() 
  or 
    notOk => a(attacker, A) 
  ) 
  a(victim3, V) 
  
(a) Interaction models 
 Clause 1 
a(victim1, V):: 
  null <- fact1() then   
  ( ok => a(attacker, A) <- decide() 
  or 
    notOk => a(attacker, A) 
  ) 
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(c) Conceptual representations 
 
label(fact1,l).     label(fact2,l).  
label(ok,l).            label(notOk,l).    
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5.4.1.3 Information Leakage Analysis 
After the conceptual representation of interaction models, in which injections and queries are 
defined, we analyse them to detect the possibility of information leakage. A leakage happens 
when a malicious agent infers any confidential fact about its counterpart’s local knowledge.  
In potential active probing attacks, we want to know when an agent plays a role in an 
interaction model designed by an adversary, in which some queries are asked,	what secret 
information the adversary can infer. We then use a theorem prover such as Counterdog (Becker 
and Sultana 2012). Counterdog is an automated reasoning tool by Microsoft Research for a 
counterfactual meta-logic on propositional Datalog1 programs. Counterdog is complete for this 
logic (i.e. can prove or disprove counterfactual statements) and accepts classical propositional 
logic statements as input. This prover employs an inference system for detectability2 (Bryans, 
Koutny, et al. 2008) of a specific property in the input statements.  
In Fig.  5-2 (a), a simple template of an active probing attack scenario is illustrated. The 
victim agent interacts with an attacker agent using three clauses of an interaction model 
published by an adversary. The constraints fact1 and fact2 and their combinations, which we call 
injections, are placed in the indication model. The same query (about the decision of the agent) 
is asked in the three interactions. In this attack, the assumption is that the injection could change 
the agent’s knowledge state, which affects the agent’s decisions. In other words, these 
constraints are information added to the knowledge-base of the vendor agent and could shape its 
decisions. If the attacker’s query is unsuccessful the first two times (notOk message is sent) and 
successful for the third time (ok message is sent back to the attacker), after some analysis, the 
adversary can infer that the secret (which is a confidential fact) holds.  
To check whether an adversary can deduce secret information form the interaction, we can 
formulate the attack in the following format accepted by the Counterdog prover: 
|-  [fact1] ~ok  &  [fact2] ~ok  &  [fact1] ok  -->  secret 
                                                           
1 Propositional Datalog is similar to Prolog, but all predicate parameters are constants and it does not have the 
“impure” features (such as cut, not, etc.) commonly presented in Prolog implementation.  
2 Detectability or non-opacity is an information flow property that denotes the ability to infer a specific predicate from 
a set of rules. 
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In this formula, the facts that hold (injections) are in bracket and the query result comes after 
that. The secret term to be investigated is placed after the --> operator. The prover determines if 
the formula is a valid theorem or a non-theorem. 
As revealing secret information is important to us, we need to check the detectability of each 
secret LCC term to ensure high security information does not leak.  
 
5.4.1.4 Updating the LCC Rewrite Rules 
The proposed information leakage analysis can be performed before running the interaction 
model or at run-time. If we perform information leakage analysis before run-time, we need to 
check all possibilities of the query result.  In the run-time analysis, the analyser is executed at 
each step of the LCC clause expansion, and if no leakage is detected, it allows the interaction to 
continue; so we would need an automatic translation of LCC code into the conceptual 
representation. 
In order to integrate the automatic abstraction phase into the LCC interpreter, we upgrade 
the LCC clause expansion mechanism (as explained in Chapter 2) to detect probing attacks.  The 
general format of the new rewrite rules is as following: 
s(∆, ReW, ∆′), 
in which s is the notion of the new rewrite rules, ∆ is the current security context, ReW is an 
LCC rewrite rule in Fig.  2-2 (page 21), and ∆′ is the updated security context after expanding the 
rewrite rule. ∆= (Π, R, K), where Π is the mapping between LCC terms and security labels, R is 
the conceptual representation of interaction models and contains the set of injections and queries 
and K is the agents’ current state of knowledge.  
, `7 ⇒ % ← 	 ,	,,9⇒:; 	*7 ⇒ %, Δ, ΔOa 							#$			-b0'*0_'-3BΔ,Δ′, C ∧ 	,0#,$#-.,Δ′ 
where 
C = the constraint to be satisfied  
∆ = security context before abstraction of C,  
∆′ = security context after abstraction of C, 
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and extract_rep function extracts the conceptual representation of an LCC term. The updated 
LCC rewrite rules are shown in Fig.  5-3. 
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Fig.  5-3: The Updated LCC rewrite rules for  expansion of one clause P in an 
interaction model. 
 
The definition of LCC traces (Robertson, Barker, et al. 2009) is extended to include secrecy 
analysis (Fig.  2-3). As described in Chapter 2, S is the state of an interaction, Mi is the initial set 
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of messages, p is a unique identifier for an agent. The ⊇G  operator in E ⊇G EH	selects a clause Sp 
from the interaction state S. EH ∪G E merges specific clause Sp to S and generate a new interaction 
state S′. i(S, Mi, Sf, ∆, ∆′) is true when the sequence of interactions and an initial set of messages 
Mi change the initial state of the interaction model S and security context ∆ to the state Sf and the 
security context ∆′. LA is responsible for the information leakage analysis, described in 
section  5.4.1.3, through calling the Counterdog theorem prover. Counterdog can also be called 
as a web service, as it has a web interface. If it detects an attack, it will prevent the expansion of 
the rest of the interaction model and will generate an alert.   
#BE, 7 , EI,∆,∆IC 	↔ 	gE = EI∧
∆ = ∆Ih	∨ L
MMN
E ⊇G EH 																															 ∧,EH  ,	,,EOH,∆,∆O 	∧ i%∆O, 3 	∧EH ∪G E = EO 																							∧#BEO,7P, EI,∆,∆IC														 Q
RRS 
E ⊇G EH 	↔ 	 ∃	,  . EH ∈ E				 ∧ 			EH = ,  ∷   
 Fig.  5-4: Revised definition of a trace through an LCC interaction model S that 




Conceptual modelling of the agent’s interaction models as a countermeasure to information 
leakage vulnerabilities has been described by an example addressing active probing attacks on 
LCC protocols. 
The main advantages of this approach are its independence from the LCC implementation 
and the flexibility in using existing secrecy analysis tools.  Conceptual modelling is not depend 
on the LCC interpreter, which might have been implemented in Prolog, Java, etc., as the model 
of the LCC interactions are analysed not the LCC codes. We employed Counterdog, while other 
automated reasoning tools such as ProVerif (Blanchet 2001) can be used to prevent information 
leakage.  
The main drawback of the conceptual modelling approach is that we check the encoded LCC 
protocols, rather than the LCC code itself. Hence, it might be difficult to pin-point the exact 
cause of the found leakages in the original LCC code. Furthermore, automatic abstraction, which 
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is the key to implement an automatic information leakage analysis in the conceptual modelling 
method, is not easy to generalise. This is because there is no unique way to abstract different 
exploitation scenarios. In the given example, in the process of defining queries, a proper result is 
very much dependant on user opinion. 
It is important to note that the suggested detection example is intended to detect only one 
type of information leakage, i.e. as a result of active probing attacks. To detect all insecure 
information flows, the abstraction and analysis phases need to be extended.  
If we want to prevent information leakage, it is necessary to simulate the interactions that an 
agent undertakes, before run-time, and to know the security level of each term, the constraints 
that hold and the query results in advance. This simulation might not be accurate, undermining 
the analysis based on it. In a more cautious approach, ambiguous interaction models may be 
rejected. In run-time analysis we cannot guarantee to prevent a leak before it happens and we 
may only detect it when it has already occurred, which would be too late.  
As free variables in formulas are disallowed in Counterdog, conceptual representations with 
variables need to be bound to a quantifier or converted to ground expressions. Nevertheless, if 
the detection happens at run-time, finding a ground substitute might not cause loss of generality 
in practice. This is because variables normally have been replaced with constants, before the 
conceptual representation phase.  
Language-based information flow analysis of LCC codes is another countermeasure for 
information leakage in open MAS that overcome most of the weaknesses. The next section 
describes this approach. 
 
 
5.4.2 Language-based Information Flow Analysis 
Information flow analysis is one of the main techniques for studying confidentiality (Gorrieri, 
Martinelli and Matteucci 2009). Conventional security mechanisms usually target the operating 
system or low-level network communications and treat programs as black boxes, so they do not 
guarantee end to end security. Secure information flow analysis restrains both access to 
information and use of information by enforcing an end-to-end security policy. 
Sound type systems are a promising language-based technique to specify and implement an 
information flow policy (Sabelfeld and Myers 2003). This is because security type checkers can 
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automatically enforce security rules in programmes. In the security type checking approach, 




Fig.  5-5: Three steps of information flow analysis using a security type system. 
 
We propose a language-based information flow analysis framework for agent interaction 
models designed using the LCC language. In this framework, a security type system is designed 
for the LCC language to apply information flow controls on interaction models. The three steps 
for analysing information flow using the security type checking technique are shown in Fig.  5-5. 
To perform the secrecy analysis, the first step is defining the security policy (confidentiality 
policy) by annotation of the LCC code with security labels. This is similar to the annotation step 
in section  5.4.1.1. Security labels can be saved in the LCC interaction model file or as a separate 
file. So, the confidentiality policy can be created by the designer, programmer or the user of the 
interaction model.  
The next step is automatic assignment of security types to LCC terms based on the syntactic 
structure of the terms. If there is any constraint that accepts different kinds of arguments (i.e. 
read-only, write-only, read-write) the annotation process is semi-automatic, i.e. the argument 
types need to be identified manually. This is due to the fact that the difference of arguments 
cannot be inferred from the syntax of the constraints.The third step is running the type checker 
against the code. We argue that type checking is a promising approach to prevent explicit and 
implicit insecure flows in order to guarantee secrecy. In the next chapter, this approach will be 
described in detail; both static and dynamic security type checking will be discussed. 
 
Annotation Type Assignment 
Security Type 
Checking 
The interaction model 
with security labels 
Download/create 
an LCC interaction 
models 




In this chapter, we have addressed the information leakage problem in open MAS governed by 
electronic institutions and developed secrecy analysis frameworks for LCC interaction models. 
Explicit and implicit insecure information flows have been explained using a number of LCC 
examples. The two approaches to detect and prevent insecure information flows in choreography 
systems using the LCC language are conceptual modeling of interaction models and language-
based information flow analysis. 
The conceptual modeling method includes three steps namely: annotation, abstraction and 
information leakage analysis. In an example on the detection of active probing attack against 
LCC protocols, we have described these steps. In the annotation phase, we label LCC interaction 
models to reflect the secrecy level (high or low) of each term. For each interaction model, the 
abstraction generates a conceptual (logical) representation that helps to find information leaks. 
In the information leakage analysis phase, we have used the Counterdog theorem prover to 
detect the possibility of private information disclosure by an adversary. The exemplar 
information leakage analysis tells us whether an adversary could infer some facts from the local 
knowledge of an agent, by placing some constraints in an interaction model and asking some 
queries. The suggested attack detection system can be deployed on each agent as a part of the 
LCC interpreter. Hence, we have updated the LCC rewrite rules in the LCC interpreter to 
perform the abstraction and information leakage analysis.   
The second approach is language-based information flow analysis using security types. 
Augmenting LCC terms with security types is a promising technique because then the security 
type checkers can automatically enforce security policies in agent interactions. The next chapter 
proposes the security-typed LCC and explains this approach. 






6. Information Flow Analysis in Lightweight 
Coordination Calculus 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we introduce the security-typed LCC language. We propose a language-based 
information flow analysis technique for the LCC language to prevent information leaks problem 
by introducing a novel security type system. The proposed framework is inspired by the security 
type system of Volpano and Smith (1997).  
This chapter is laid out as follows. First, a security type system is proposed by defining the 
security levels, which represent the confidentiality policy, security types and the type inference 
rules. Then, this security type system is evaluated by proving some properties of it such as type 
soundness, simple security and confinement. Next, the dynamic and the static approaches in type 
checking are reviewed and the LCC rewrite rules are upgraded to support security types. 
Furthermore, two more information flow properties (i.e. non-interference and declassification) 
and some extensions to the type system are discussed. Then, the implementation of the dynamic 
approach is briefly described. Finally, the Conclusions section summarises the content of this 
chapter. 
 
6.2 Security Type System for LCC  
A security type system is defined by a set of type definitions and typing rules to determine if an 
interaction model is well-typed.  




6.2.1 Security Types 
The type rules are judgments of the form: Γ	⊢	T	:	ϕ, where Γ is a type environment that maps 
term T to type ϕ. Here are some definitions: 
 
Definition  6-1 (Security Type Environment):  
A security type environment (context) Γ is a finite map from LCC terms to security types and is 
defined by 
Γ		::=		empty		|	Γ,	T:	ϕ,     ( 6-1) 
in which Γ is empty (with no binding) or an updated environment that contains a mapping of the 
term T to the type ϕ. If there exists a ϕ that Γ ⊢	T	 :	ϕ,	 then	 T	 is called a well-typed  LCC 
expression under the security context of	Γ.			
 
Definition  6-2 (Security Types): 
The security types of our system are defined as following: 
ϕ = τ | uTrm τ | agent τ | con τ | op τ,     ( 6-2) 
where τ ranges over elements of security levels, agent identifiers have only type “uTrm τ”, 
agents have only type “agent τ”, constraint expressions have only type “con τ”, operational 
commands1 have only type “op τ” and messages, Constraint arguments have type “uTrm τ” or τ. 
role names and other terms (variables, constants and structures) have only type τ.  
To have a better understanding of the meanings of the security types, the following 
description explains the intuition behind them:   
                                                           
1 Operational commands are the Def keyword in the LCC syntax (Fig.  2-1): Def := Role | Message | Def then 
Def | Def or Def | null<- C | Role <- C 
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a. Γ⊢	X:	uTrm	τ  means that an updated agent identifier in a role assignment or message 
passing operation or an updated argument in a constraint has a security level higher 
than or equal to τ in context Γ. 
b. Γ⊢	T	:	τ  means that an identifier, a role name, or a message T  (with every identifier 
inside it) has a security level lower than or equal to τ in context Γ. 
c. Γ⊢	a(Role,Id):	agent	τ  means in the agent definition, agent identifier Id, to which a 
role is assigned has a security level τ or higher in context Γ. 
d. Γ⊢	C	 :	 con τ  means that the constraint name and every arguments within C has a 
security level τ or lower  in context Γ.  
e. Γ⊢D:	 op τ  means that every receiver of a message or any updated identifier in an 
operational command (i.e. Def) has a security level τ or higher  in context Γ. 
 
Γ (T) denotes the security level of the term T, e.g. if we have t1 : h   and  f1 : con l, then 
Γ (t1) = h   and Γ (f1) = l. 
Security levels are directly assigned to LCC terms by annotations of the LCC code (similar 
to section  5.4.1.1) with the following format:   
label(Term, Level). 
in which label is a keyword,  Term is any LCC term and Level is the security levels high (h) or 
low (l). The security types then assigned based on the term definitions. All security types can be 
inferred from the term structure automatically, except constraints’ arguments that need to be 
defined explicitly (by the user). By default, a constraint’s arguments are assumed to be non-
updatable and security type τ is assigned to them.  
 
6.2.2 Type Inference for LCC 
The proposed security type system for LCC programs is described by two sets of typing rules 
(Fig.  6-1) and subtyping rules (Fig.1-2). Each rule is read from bottom left and is applied 
recursively, e.g. rule Agnt states that in order to assign a role to an agent in form of a(R, ID) 
that has security type of agent τ, we must first check whether the security type of the role R is τ 
and then whether the security type of the agent identifier is uTrm τ.	 It guarantees that a high 
level role will not be assigned to a low agent. 
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The security typing rules id and uId explain if an LCC identifier (a constant or a variable) is 
defined in the environment Γ, security types τ or uTrm τ  may be assigned to it. Selection of τ or 
uTrm τ is based on the structure of the LCC expression. The security label of the current clause 
(this) is important while message passing and calling a constraint. This is created and added to 
the security environment Γ by the Init rule. 
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@+-																											 	zO ≤ z	&3	z ≤ &3	zO 	3@+-						 
Fig.  6-2: Subtyping rules 
 
The rule Snd expresses that if the sender (this), the receiver A and the message M have 
security level τ, then the sending operation (M ⇒ A) can have the security type op τ. The rule 
Rsv is the same as Snd. We need to assure that no high security message is accessed and sent by 
a low security agent; checking the security level of the sender along with the security level of the 
massage in Snd and Rsv rules guarantees this. Sending and receiving operations in LCC are 
dual, so if there exists a leakage in message sending in one clause, the same leakage will be 
detected in receiving the message in the counterpart clause. The rules Agnt, Snd and Rsv in 
conjunction with subtyping rules prevent explicit flows; they imply that assigning or sending 
public information to secret agents is possible, but not vice versa. It is similar to the concepts of 
“write up is possible” and “write down is forbidden” in the security type system for imperative 
programming languages, e.g. (Volpano and Smith 1997). 
The Call rule states that when we call a constraint, the security level of its functor1, the 
security level of the current clause (this) and the security level of either read-only arguments 
(Ti: τ	) or write-only arguments (Ti: uTrm τ	) have to be the same. This ensures us that a public 
agent can not access secret constraints and a public constraint may not reveal secret information 
to a public agent. The Struct rule denotes that in structured non-updatable terms (such as 
messages, role names and read-only arguments) the security types and levels of the functor f and 
the arguments Ti must be the same. The rules And, Or and Not are regulating the composition of 
constraints in LCC. The rule If1 states that the security type of constraint C and the message 
sending operation (M ⇒ A) needs to be matched so that the conditional expression is allowed. 
Security typing of other conditional expressions (If2 to If4) is performed in a similar way to If1.  
                                                           
1 Non-numeric constant 
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The rule Seq say that if two LCC expressions have the same security level, their composition 
has also that security level. The Choice rule functions in the same way, only it also considers the 
security level of the constraint of the first part A1 to prevent implicit information flow from the 
constraint in A2. The rule Role checks whether the role definition a(R,ID) agrees with the body 
of the LCC clause. The remaining rules of the security type system are subtyping rules in 
Fig.  6-2. The subtyping rules AgentRule, uTrmRule and opRule are contravariant1 and the 
conRule is covariant2.  
 
6.3 Evaluation of the Type System  
Two approaches to evaluate the proposed system are the analytical method using proofs and the 
experimental method by running the type system on several LCC interaction models. We choose 
the former approach and prove some of the type system properties. This is because proofs give 
stronger guarantee of the correctness of the type system and do not need large number of LCC 
interaction models with known security issues.  
Type soundness (or type safety) is the most basic feature of a type system (Pierce 2002). Two 
properties that show the type soundness in a type system are progress and preservation. In our 
security type system, preservation means that expansion of a well-typed term by the LCC 
rewrite rules is a well-typed term (clause expansion preserves well-typedness). Progress 
guarantees that a well-typed LCC expression does not get stuck in the execution of LCC clauses, 
assuming that agents can evaluate (satisfy/dissatisfy) the constraints and the necessary 
input/output messages are generated. 
 
Definition  6-3 (Final Step): An LCC expression is in its final step when either it can be 
marked as a closed expression by an LCC rewrite rule or it is a constraint that is evaluated 
by a satisfy or satisfied rule.  
 
                                                           
1 Contravariant denotes the possibility of converting from a narrower type to a wider type, e.g. from h to l.  
2 Covariant means the possibility of converting from a wider type to a narrower type, e.g. from l to h. 
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Definition  6-4 (Transition L	⇝L’	): transition of L⇝L’	means L’  is an expansion of LCC 
expression L,	either as a result of an LCC rewrite rule i	 !,,	,
, i′ (page 21, Fig.  2-2, 
rules 1-13) or as a structural expansion of a compound constraint using rules 20-25 in 
Fig.  2-2. 
 
This is an example of a compound constraint expansion: assume L	 is null	←C	 and the 
compound constraint C  is C1	∧	C2 , when C  is unfolded into C1	∧	C2		then L’	is null	←	C1	∧	C2 and 
we can write L	⇝L’. 
 
Theorem  6-1 (Progress): 
If Γ	⊢	L	:	ϕ, i.e. L is a well-typed LCC expression, then either L is a final step or else there 
exists some L’  that L⇝L’.	
Proof: By induction on the structure of Γ	⊢	L	 :	ϕ	; we apply the induction on the smaller 
derivations of typing rules assuming this property holds for all of these sub-derivations 
(above the line in typing rules) and proceed by case analysis.  
Case Seq: i = %	0ℎ-2	%( and i: &3	z, so %:	&3	z,			%(:	&3	z	
By the induction hypothesis	either A1 is a final step or else some A1’ exists that A1⇝ A1’.	Similarly,	either A2 is a final step or else some A2’ exists that A2⇝A2’. If both A1 and A2 
are final steps (closed), based on the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
*+&,-.%	0ℎ-2	  ← *+&,-.%	∧ 	*+&,-.  
A1 then A2 is a final step.  If A1 is a final step and A2⇝A2’, according to the following 
rewrite rule: 
%	0ℎ-2	%( ! ,,	,
,		 %	0ℎ-2	"													#$	*+&,-.%	∧ 	%( !,,	,
,		 " 
 A1 then A2 ⇝	 A2’. If both A1 and A2 are not final steps, which means A1⇝A1’ and A2⇝A2’, based on the following LCC rewriting rule: 
%	0ℎ-2	%( !,,	,
,		 	"	0ℎ-2	%(																																		#$	% ! ,,	,
,		 " 
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A1 then A2 ⇝	A1’.  If A1⇝A1’	and  A2 is a final step, it is not an acceptable state in LCC, 
so the result is false: A1 then A2 ⇝false. 
Case If1:  i = 7 ⇒ % ←  and i: &3	z, so 7 ⇒ %: &3	z and : *&2		z,	
By the induction hypothesis	either C is a final step or else some C’ exists that C⇝C’. If C 
is a final step, in the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
7 ⇒ % ← 	 !,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇒ % ← 																	#$	,0#,$#-., 
either the evaluation of satisfied(C) is true, so 7 ⇒ % ← 	 ! ,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇒ % ←
  or else it returns false, which indicates 7 ⇒ % ←  ! ,,	,
,∅		$+,-. In either case, L ends up in a closed state which means a final step.   
If C⇝C’, it means that C	is a compound constraint C’‘ that is equal to ¬C1,  C1	∧	C2 or C1	∨	C2, so based on one of the following rewrite rules in Fig 2-2: 
,0#,$#-.¬ ← ¬,0#,$#-., 
,0#,$#-. ∨ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∨ 	,0#,$#-.( , 
,0#,$#-. ∧ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∧ 	,0#,$#-.( , 
then we have i ⇝ 7 ⇒ % ← ′. 
We showed only a subset of the cases; other cases are discussed in Appendix A. □ 
 
Theorem  6-2 (Preservation): 
If Γ	⊢	L:	ϕ, i.e. L is a well-typed LCC expression and L⇝L’, then Γ	⊢	L’	:	ϕ’. 	
Proof: By induction on the structure of Γ	⊢	L	:	ϕ	and proceed by case analysis  (similar to the 
proof of Theorem  6-1). 
Case Seq: i = %	0ℎ-2	%( and i: &3	z	
We know that L is well-typed, so we have	%:	&3	τ	2.	%(:	&3	τ. According to the 
following rewrite rules: 
%	0ℎ-2	%( !,,	,
,		 	"	0ℎ-2	%(												#$	% ! ,,	,
,		 ") 




,		 %	0ℎ-2	"												#$	*+&,-.%	∧ 	%( !,,	,
,		 "      
the transition L⇝L’ happens either by % !,,	,
,		 " or when A1 is a final step 
(closed(A1)), by %( !,,	,
,		 ". 
If ¬closed(A1), the % !, ,	,
,		 " can be derived by any of the clause expansion 
rewrite rules, some of the cases are shown; others are similar: 
1) Subcase % = ,  ←  
By the induction hypothesis, we have ,  ← : &3	z, A1⇝A1’ and %′: &3	z. The 
following rewrite rule, which deals with recursion in LCC, is the only rule that expands A1:  
 ,  ←  !,,	,
,∅		,  ∷   #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷   ∧ ,0#,$#-.. 
So we have  %O = ,  ∷ B. Consequently, %	0ℎ-2	%( ⇝ 	,  ∷ B	0ℎ-2	%( and %	0ℎ-2	%(: op τ. 
2) Subcase % = 7 ⇒ % 
By the induction hypothesis, we have 7 ⇒ %: &3	z, A1⇝A1’ and %′: &3	z. The rewrite 
rule that handles A1 is only 7 ⇒ %	 !,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇒ %. So we have %O =*7 ⇒ %. Consequently, %	0ℎ-2	%( ⇝ 	7 ⇒ %	0ℎ-2	%( and %	0ℎ-2	%(: op τ. 
Other subcases are similar. 
 
Case If1:  
We know that i ≡ 7 ⇒ % ←  is well-typed; i: &3	z, so 7 ⇒ %: &3	z and : *&2		z, we 
also have L⇝L’.	
Based on the LCC rewriting rule (9) in Fig 2-2 and the definition of transition ⇝, the 
possible expansions of L to L’ are: 
1) If C⇝C’, it means that C	is equal to a compound constraint C’‘ that might be ¬C1,  C1	∧	 C2 or C1	∨	 C2	. Then we have i′ ≡ 7 ⇒ % ← ′. By the induction hypothesis, ′: *&2		z, hence, based on the type rule If1,   7 ⇒ % ← ′:	&3	z. 
Chapter 6: Information Flow Analysis in LCC 
92 
 
2) If satisfied C returns true, then it is a final step: 
7 ⇒ % ← 	 !,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇒ % ←  and based on the type rule Close, the 
typing of the LCC expression will not be changed: 
	| ⊢ 7 ⇒ % ← :	&3	z| ⊢ *7 ⇒ % ← :	&3	z +&,- 
3) If satisfied	 C returns false which means: 7 ⇒ % ← 	 !,,	,
,,∅$+,- , then 
based on the type rule False we have: false: op h, i.e. L’: op h     
We showed only a subset of the cases; other cases are discussed in Appendix B. □ 
 
Two important properties of a security type system are ‘No Read Up’ and ‘No Write Down’ 
or ‘simple security’ and ‘confinement’ as referred to by (Smith and Volpano 1998). No Read Up 
means that identifiers within a message or a constraint can not have security level higher than the 
massage level or the constraint level. In other words, when a message (or a constraint) has a 
security level τ, it assures us that it will not reveal any information with security level more than τ. 
‘No Write Down’ means having an operational command with the security level of op τ	(any 
operational command), any updatable identifier within it has a security level higher than or equal 
to τ. By updatable identifier, we mean an agent when a role is assigned to it or a message is sent 
to it. We also mean an argument in a constraint whose value is updated. E.g. this denotes that it 
is not possible to assign (send) a higher role (higher message) to a lower agent.  
 
Proposition  6-3 (No Read Up): 
If T		is a well-typed LCC constraint, message or identifier with security type τ;	i.e.	Γ	⊢T:	τ		or	Γ	⊢T:	con	τ, then T  contains only identifiers with security level not higher than τ. 	
It can be proved by induction on derivation of Γ	⊢	T	:	τ	and	Γ	⊢	T	:	con	τ;	i.e.	induction 
on the smaller derivations that are used to derive Γ	⊢	 T	 :	 τ and	Γ	⊢	T	 :	 con	τ, then 
proceeding by case analysis on the typing rule that was applied last in the proof of Γ	⊢	T. 




Proposition  6-4 (Confinement): 
If T	is a well-typed agent definition or LCC operation; i.e.	Γ	⊢T:	agent	τ	 	or	Γ	⊢T:	op	τ, 
then any agent identifier in the agent definition, any receiver of a message, or any updated 
term in an operation, has a security level equal or higher than τ. 
 
It can be Proved by case analysis on the rule that was applied last in the proof of Γ	⊢	T	:	
ϕ and by induction on the type rules that are used to derive Γ	⊢	T	:	ϕ.  
 
In the next section, we show how the security type system can be used by the LCC 
interpreter at run-time to verify whether an interaction model is secure. 
 
6.4 Dynamic Information Flow Analysis 
Dynamic (run-time) information flow analysis can appropriately be added to LCC language 
because of the dynamic nature of LCC language. Dynamic security checks may be accomplished 
via two similar approaches: monitors (Russo and Sabelfeld 2010) or dynamic security typing 
(Hennigan, Kerschbaumer, et al. 2011). We select the latter approach to use the proposed type 
system (section  6.9). 
Based on the reaction policy, type checking could result in termination of the execution or 
breach detection and continuation of the clause expansion (Fig.  6-3).   




Fig.  6-3: Upgrading the LCC interpreter (a) LCC interpreter executes LCC codes (b) 
Amended LCC interpreter performs the security type checking and executes the 
secrecy annotated LCC codes  
 
LCC clauses are well-typed by ensuring that every expansion of them is performed 
according the corresponding security typing rule. Security type checking is performed using the 
proposed formal type system which ensures that the security types of LCC terms are used 
consistently. 
In order to integrate dynamic information flow analysis into the LCC interpreter and to 
detect or prevent information leakage, the LCC clause expansion mechanism (Robertson 2005) 
(explained in section  2.3) has been upgraded by amending the LCC rewrite rules.  
The extended LCC rewrite rules augmented with dynamic type checking are shown in 
Fig.  6-4. The updated rewrite rules in Fig.  6-4 are of the form 	 !,,	,
,∆ 	, where Y is the 
expansion of X performing role Ri, Mi is the initial set of messages, O is the output message set, 
and Mo is the subset of Mi which is not yet processed and P is the interaction model. ∆ is the 
current security environment. Δ=Γ,	K,	Π,	L,	Σ	, where Γ is the mapping between LCC terms 
and secrecy labels (the confidentiality policy), K is the agents’ current state of knowledge, Π is 
the reaction policy defining the desired behaviour when an unacceptable information flow is 
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keeps a record of provenance information about the agent’s counterparts, who have interacted 
with the current agent. Elements of Δ	could be denoted as	Δmember; e.g. ΔΓ		is	Γ or ΔΠ		is	Π. Consequently, the LCC expansion of the initial clause Ci to the final clause Cn under the 
security environment ∆ is as follows.  
 	,		,
,∆ , … ,  		,	,
,∆  
 
typeChk(X,Δ) is in charge of checking the possibility of information leakage from LCC 
expression X using the security type system introduced in section  6.2. Type checking is 
performed when the other conditions for rewriting an expression are met. E.g. only if 7 ⇐ % ∈7 in (8) or satisfied(C) in (9) return true, then typeChk(X,Δ) is called.  
As a result of rewrite rules in Fig.  6-4, the clause of the interaction model appropriate to the 
given role is expanded. The first rule starts unpacking a clause by expanding its body (B) and the 
rules (2) to (12) expand different parts of the clause body. Based on the closed rules in (13) to 
(18), an interaction rule is decided to be closed.   
The interpreter tries to find a matching rewrite rule for each LCC expression, if no match is 
found, it means that there is a syntax error in the LCC code. If a match is found but the 
conditions of the rewrite rule are not fulfilled, it returns false and continues to find another 
rewrite rule that matches the expression. 
,  ∷  	 !, ,	,
,		∆ ,  ∷ "									#$		 	 ! , ,	,
,		∆ " ∧ 	0>3-ℎ¢, : :	", ∆	     (28) 
%	&'	%( ! ,,	,
,		∆ "																																	#$	¬*+&,-.%( 	∧ 		% !, ,	,
,		∆ "      (29) 
%	&'	%( !, ,	,
,		∆ "																																		#$	¬*+&,-.% 	∧ 	%( !,,	,
,		∆ "      (30) 




,		 	"	0ℎ-2	%(										#$	% £,¤,	¤,¥,¦		∆ "         (31) 
%	0ℎ-2	%( ! ,,	,
,		∆ %	0ℎ-2	"					#$	*+&,-.% 	∧ 	%( £,¤,	¤,¥,¦		∆ " ∧ 	0>3-ℎ¢%	0ℎ-2	", ∆ (32) 
%	3'	%( ! ,,	,
,	∪5	∆ "	3'	"(	  
		#$	% !, ,	 ,
,			∆ " 	∧ 	%( !,,	,
,5		∆ "( ∧ 	0>3-ℎ¢"	3'	"(, ∆ (33) 
 ← 7 ⇐ % ! , ,	9⇐:;,
,∅		∆ *B ← 7 ⇐ %, ∆iC	  #$	7 ⇐ % ∈ 7 ∧ 0>3-ℎ¢ ← 7 ⇐ %, ∆ ∧ ,0#,$>  (34) 
7 ⇐ % !, ,	9⇐:;,
,∅		∆ *7 ⇐ %,∆i																		#$	7 ⇐ % ∈ 7 ∧ 0>3-ℎ¢7 ⇐ %, ∆       (35) 
7 ⇒ % ← 	 !,,	,
,9⇒:;∆ *7 ⇒ % ← , ∆i				#$	,0#,$#-. ∧ 0>3-ℎ¢7 ⇒ % ← , ∆    (36) 
7 ⇒ %	 !,,	,
,9⇒:;∆ *7 ⇒ %, ∆i																									#$	0>3-ℎ¢7 ⇒ %, ∆         (37) 
2@++ ← 	 ! ,,	,
,∅,∆ 	*2@++ ← , ∆i						#$	,0#,$#-. 	∧ 0>3-ℎ¢2@++ ← , ∆	           (38) 
,  ←  ! , ,	,
,∅		∆ ,  ∷  				  											#$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷   ∧ ,0#,$#-. 	∧ 0>3-ℎ¢,  ← , ∆ (39) 
,  !,,	,
,∅		∆ ,  ∷  				    #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷          (40) 
 
*+&,-.B*, iC                (41) *+&,-.%	&'	  ← *+&,-.%	∨ 	*+&,-.              (42) *+&,-.%	3'	  ← *+&,-.% 	∧ 	*+&,-.             (43) *+&,-.%	0ℎ-2	  ← *+&,-.% 	∧ 	*+&,-.             (44) *+&,-. ∷   ← *+&,-.               (45) 
Fig.  6-4: The amended LCC rewrite rules, which include security-related information 
and security type checking, for expansion of one clause in an interaction model in the 
LCC interpreter.  
 
It is the agents’ responsibility to satisfy the constraints in the clause and it is assumed that 
agents have a mechanism to fulfil the constraints. satisfied(C) is true if C can be satisfied from 
the current knowledge state K	of the agent and satisfy(C) is true when K can be made to fulfil the 
constraint C. clause (P, X) is true if clause X exists in the interaction model P.  
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The algorithm for a simple type checking (typeChk) is defined in Fig.  6-5. In Fig.  6-6, an 
updated typeChk algorithm is defined, in which based on the result of the type checking and the 
reaction policy Π, true or false is returned.  
In this version of LCC clause expansion, three secrecy policies affect the behaviour of the 
LCC interpreter: prevention, detection and no-detection. The default policy is prevention 
(prevMode) that averts expansion of the current expression when a leakage is found. If the 
detection policy (detectMode) is selected in Π, the interpreter only keeps a record of the 
confidentiality breaches and continues to expand the expression X. Selection of the no-detection 
policy (noChkMode) bypass the information flow analysis and the LCC interpreter do not 
perform the type checking procedure. The false result from typeChk(X,Δ) shows that a breach is 
found and the true result means either the type checking option is off, no leakage is found, or a 
leakage is found but the detection mode is on.  
 
Table  6-1: Different reaction policy modes in security type checking: prevention, 
detection and no-detection modes. 
Reaction Policy 
modes 
Priority (Pre, Det, NoCk) Type checking typeChk result 
when a leakage is found 
prevMode 1 1 0 0 Yes False 
detectMode 2 0 1 0 Yes True 
noChkMode 3 0 0 1 No True 
  




typeChk(X, ∆) { 
TR = findTypeRule(X);  // find a security typing rule that matches 
X  
Br = checkBreach(X, TR, ∆);      // type check to find a breach   
if ( Br ≠ null ) {      // if a leakage is found 
Update (∆(L), ∆(Σ), Br, X); // save the new leakage info in L 
and Σ 
Continue = FALSE;           // prevent the clause expansion  
} else   Continue = TRUE;      // no information leaks   
return Continue; 
}  
Fig.  6-5:  A basic security type checking algorithm of typeCkh(X,Δ)  
 
typeChk(X, ∆) { 
  if( ¬noChkMode(∆) ){  // perform the information flow analysis 
TR = findTypeRule(X);  // find a security typing rule that matches 
X  
Br = checkBreach(X, TR, ∆);      // type check to find a breach   
if ( Br ≠ null ) {      // if a leakage is found 
Update (∆(L), ∆(Σ), Br, X); // save the new breach in L and Σ 
if ( prevMode(∆) )   
   Continue = FALSE;       // prevent the clause expansion  
else         // detectMode(∆) 
     Continue = TRUE;      // detect and continue 
} 
} else   Continue = TRUE;      // no information leaks   
} else Continue = TRUE;           // no information flow analysis 
return Continue; 
}  
Fig.  6-6:  The updated security type checking algorithm of typeCkh(X,Δ)  




When a leakage is found, there might be cases in which the clause expansion failure itself 
leaks some information to the adversary and informs them that some high level information is 
blocked from them.  
To minimise this kind of information leakage and to have more flexible secrecy policies, 
new options forming the type checking strategy can be defined in Π. In Table  6-1, the following 
three reaction policy modes and their priorities are shown: prevention (prevMode), detection 
(detectMode) and no-detection (noChkMode). The new secrecy policy is defined as the 
following: 
Π	= (Pre, Det, NoCk), 
in which users can choose a policy by selecting one of the Boolean values Pre, Det and 
NoCk (Table  6-1). Only one policy may be activated at a time; which means if more than one 
option is chosen, based on the defined priorities they may be overridden. E.g. both Π=(1,0,1) and 
(1,0,0) have the same effect, as Pre overrides Det and NoChk values and results in prevention 
mode. 
 
6.4.1 Drawbacks of Dynamic Type Checking 
The main disadvantage of purely run-time information flow analysis similar to the one discussed 
above, is their false negative result as they cannot detect implicit information flows. This is 
because in dynamic security analysis of LCC, all execution paths of the program are not 
checked. The following simple example show when the dynamic analysis can go wrong. All 
terms are low security and the only terms with high security levels are Secret and this (i.e. the 
current clause environment). 
( publicMessage1 => a(publicAgent, P) <- check(Secret) ) 
or   
 publicMessage2 => a(publicAgent, P)  
 
The following rewrite rule handles the first part of the code: 
7 ⇒ % ← 	 !,,	,
,9⇒:;∆ *7 ⇒ % ← , ∆i							#$	,0#,$#-. ∧ 0>3-ℎ¢7 ⇒ % ← , ∆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Let us assume the constraint does not hold; i.e. satisfied (check(Secret)) return false, 
so the first part of the conditional statement fails and the second part is processed by this rewrite 
rule: 
7 ⇒ %	 !, ,	,
,9⇒:;∆ *7 ⇒ %, ∆i																									#$	0>3-ℎ¢7 ⇒ %, ∆,  
then the type checking is as below: 
  
	 0ℎ#,: -20	ℎ	{	|| ⊢ A2: @y'}	ℎ ., -20	ℎ ≤ -20	+| ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	+	§ E@,																																																																															
																																									3@+#*7-,,-2 ∶ +	{	|	| ⊢ 3@+#*7-,,-2 ∶ + ., 		
3@+#*%-20: +	{	|	| ⊢ 3@+#*%-20: +	§ ., A: +	{	|| ⊢ A: @y'}	+ .| ⊢ 3@+#*%-20, A:	-20	+ %20| ⊢ 3@+#*7-,,-2	 => 	3@+#*%-20, A: &3	+	 E2. 
This is detected as a well-typed LCC command, which is wrong! This is because based on a 
high security constraint as described in section  5.3.3. 
Another possible problem is late detection of the insecure flow in run-time security checking 
of LCC interaction models. This may result in the rewriting of some illegal LCC expressions and 
changing the state of the agent before finding the breach, for example; detection of the breach 
after a high security message is sent to a low security agent is too late. 
Generally, dynamic checking (in the best case), may assure that the current execution of an 
interaction model does not leak information, but does not tell us that the code is safe and will 
never reveal any confidential information in future, because it does not check all possible 
execution paths of the LCC program. In other words, if no breach occurs in dynamic checking, it 
means that there exists a secure execution path in the LCC interaction model. This is a Liveness 
property, which specifies that eventually "good things" do happen versus a Safety property, 
which states that no "bad things" occur during program execution (Halpern and Schneider 1987).  
 
6.5 Static Information Flow Analysis 
In static information flow analysis, LCC interaction modes are validated before being run. Static 
analysis of programmes using security type systems conservatively detects implicit and explicit 
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information flows and provides stronger security assurance (Sabelfeld and Myers 2003). We can 
perform static analysis to overcome the drawbacks of dynamic methods.   
The static checking explores all execution paths in LCC interaction models, hence it 
guarantees that detection of any insecure flow based on the defined type system. To perform a 
static type check, we can modify the LCC rewrite rules for the static type check, in a way that 
the whole expansion tree of an LCC clause is explored. In recursions, the clause is expanded if it 
has not already been expanded (Fig.  6-7).  
More examples of security type checking are given in the cloud computing case study in 
Chapter  7. 
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Fig.  6-7: Static analysis of an LCC clause by expansion of an LCC clause.  
 
6.5.1 Drawbacks of Static Type Checking  
Static type checking to prevent insecure information flows conservatively detects implicit and 
explicit information flows, provides stronger security assurance and proves program correctness 
with reasonable computation cost (Sabelfeld and Myers 2003) and (Huang, et al. 2004), but it 
has some drawbacks. The main disadvantages of static type checking are: 
1) False positive results: non-permissiveness of some secure information flows; static type 
checks suffer from over-approximation and may prevent genuine interaction models.   
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2) Lack of information in static checking; we may not know the security level of all peers 
and components of the program, especially in an open MAS we may not know who will 
join the system during the interactions. In practice, security policies cannot be 
determined at the time of program analysis and may vary dynamically.  
 
3) The proposed type system which is based on Denning's work ignores leaks via the 
termination behaviour of programs. Therefore they satisfy only termination-insensitive 
non-interference (Sabelfeld and Russo 2010), which is defined in the next section.  
4) Exhaustive checking of every possible path in the execution tree of the LCC code is 
time-consuming, while dynamic checking is faster, because it concerns only one 
execution path of the program. 
 
Some role names, constraints, variables and the security level of the terms may not be 
available to our static analysis. The LCC programmer or the expert who annotate the code by 
security levels may not know about the behaviour of some constraints and other variables, which 
will be available at run-time. E.g. in the cloud configuration case study, some general patterns 
are used and some constraints and roles’ arguments are defined at execution time by the 
counterpart agent. 
The following codes presents some examples that the static type checking rejects, while they 
do not cause any information leakage: 
SecretMessage => a(publicAgent, P)<- smallerThan(PublicVar, PublicVar)  
in which the constraint is never satisfied (because the public variable PublicVar cannot be 
smaller than itself), so under no circumstances will the secret message be sent to the public agent 
P. In a similar example bellow, the constraint is always satisfied, therefore the second part of the 
conditional statement, in which a secret message leaks, never runs and no message is sent. 
( null <- equals(PublicVar, PublicVar)  
 or  
 SecretMessage => a(publicAgent, P) ) 
 
In general, any LCC code containing a low security expression within a high security 
constraint, which does not hold at run-time is rejected by static type checking, even though it is 
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permissible. This is due to the fact that the security checker cannot know whether or not a 
constraint holds at the time the interaction model is checked, so it conservatively rejects the 
interaction model.  
As mentioned before, information might also leak via termination behaviour of the program, 
e.g. in the following code: 
a(secretAgent, S):: 
null <- notEqual(SecretID, 0) then 
a(secretAgent, S) 
 
The adversary learns that SecretID was 0, by observing the termination of the clause.  
 
6.6 Non-interference 
Non-interference is a popular information flow property that guarantees secrecy of information 
flow and tells us whether there is any information leakage in the information system. Non-
interference was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer (1982), but its concept goes back to the 
notion of strong dependency introduced by Cohen (1977).  
The intuition behind the non-interference property is that high-security input to the program 
must never affect low-security output. In other words, public outputs are not dependent on secret 
inputs. In the following secrecy analysis of the LCC interaction models, we consider received 
messages, role arguments, and sometimes constraint arguments as input and the sent messages as 
output. There are formulations of non-interference. In this section, we define the notion of non-
interference for the LCC interaction models inspired by the definitions of Hedin and Sabelfeld 
(2011) and Becker (2010).  
Before defining non-interference, we need to define visibility, alikeness, and observational 
equivalence as prerequisites: 
Definition  6-5 (Visibility): The set visiblei (Γ) denotes the LCC terms in the context Γ that 
can be observed by other agents (or adversaries) with the security level l or higher:  
visiblel (Γ) = { T ∈ Γ | Γ (T) ≤ l } 
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Definition  6-6 (Alikeness1)  
Γ1 ≈l Γ2: Two security contexts Γ1 and Γ2 are alike up to the level l iff: 
visiblel (Γ1) = visiblel (Γ2).  
 
For example, if we have the following two contexts: Γ1= { m1: l, m2: l, m3: h } and Γ2= { 
m1: l, m2: l, m3: h , m4: h }, then: visiblel (Γ1)={m1, m2} and visiblel (Γ2)={m1, m2}, which 
means other agents with security level of at least l can see these information. We also have 
Γ1 ≈l Γ2. 
Recall the LCC clause expansion mechanism of an original LCC clause Ci into Cn in terms 
of the interaction model P (introduced in section  6.4):  
 	,		,
,∆ , … ,  		,	,
,∆  
where security environment Δ=Γ,	K,	Π,	L,	Σ		and On is an output message set that can expresse 
the observable behaviour of an agent by its counterpart agents. We now define the 
Observational Equivalence relation on behaviour as follows.   
Definition  6-7 (Observational Equivalence2)  
On1≡l On2: The observable behaviours of two clause expansions in terms of the interaction 
model P are observationally equivalent up to level l, if an adversary of level l cannot 
distinguish between On1 and On2. 
Observational equivalence of On1 and On2 can (imprecisely) be interpreted as two runs of an 
interaction model that are the same from the adversary’s point of view. Alikeness and 
observational equivalence are then used to define the notion of non-interference for the LCC 
interaction models. In the following, for the sake of clarity, the notion of the security context Γ is 
used instead of the security environment ∆. This is safe to do, because in our investigation, Γ 
only changes within ∆. 
 
                                                           
1 Alikeness up to level l is known as low equivalence in the literature. 
2 Observational Equivalence is also called indistinguishability. 
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Definition  6-8 (Non-interference)  
∀ Γ1, Γ2. (Γ1≈l Γ2)  ∧		 	,		,
,ª«¬Γ¬ 		∧		 	,	5,
,ª«­Γ­ (	⇒  (On1≡l On2) 
 
This states that for any two contexts Γ1 and Γ2 which are alike up to level of l, a successful 
expansion of the LCC clause Ci in one of the contexts with behaviour On1 and a successful 
expansion in the other context with behaviour On1 guarantee that the behaviours are 
observationally equivalent. 
Informally, if two clauses look the same to an adversary, they also behave the same. In other 
words, low output (the sent messages to an adversary) depends on low inputs (the immutable 
visible parts of the contexts).  
The proposed security type system in section  6.2 supports non-interference; Suppose Ci is a 
message sending operation 7 ⇒ %. If the type of the agent A is agent	h, the typing rule Snd 
allows sending a message (with any security level) to the high security agent A, in either case, an 
adversary of level l cannot observe any output message.  If the type of A is agent	l , then the type 
system requires that M : l , then any the observable output of the LCC rewrite rule for an 
adversary of level l will be message M. The other cases of Ci that can have an observable 
behaviour are similar. 
 
This definition of non-interference is termination-insensitive, which denotes it disregards 
information leaks due to the termination of the program (e.g. the last example in section  5.3.2). 
Thus, our type system cannot detect this type of insecure flows. 
Although the notion of non-interference is a popular and natural way of describing 
confidentiality and integrity, it may be too restrictive for many applications (Hedin and 
Sabelfeld 2011). The next section addresses this issue. 
 




Declassification is intentional release of secret information by lowering security levels of 
information (Zdancewic and Myers 2001). Sometimes, we need a way of information 
declassification in our security system.  
A typical example is any system that asks the user credentials for authentication. Consider 
the access request to a patient record by a specialist (e.g. interaction model in Fig.  3-3). 
Rejection of a wrong password violates non-interference, because of the dependency between 
high input (i.e. password) and low output (i.e. rejection message). That implies the system leaks 
partial information about the password (i.e. incorrectness of the password) to a potential attacker. 
However, this leakage does not give valuable information to the attacker.  
To support declassification in our security type system, we can deliberately downgrade the 
security classification of information by adding the following rule: 
declassify(h) = l 
 This violates non-interference, but it may be necessary for some applications. We should 
carefully declassify information. In (Sabelfeld and Sands 2005) the principles and dimensions of 
declassification are described by identifying what can be declassified, who controls the 
declassification, where the declassification happens and when the declassification can occur 
relative to other events in the program. 
 
6.8 Extensions to the Typing Rules 
The proposed type system may be extended to be more general, flexible, or fulfil different 
requirements. In this section we discuss some extensions to the typing rules that can expand the 
information flow analysis mechanism.  
In the proposed security typing rules (Fig.  6-1), uTrm can only support variables, not 
structured terms; e.g. Only variables can be updated, not lists. This seems a reasonable 
assumption, if the term is an agent identifier but not for an argument in a constraint. To support 
data structures (such as lists) as updatable arguments in a constraint we need to add another 
typing rule:   
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	| ⊢ $: @y'}		z, | ⊢ y:	@y'}	z| ⊢ $y:	@y'}	z @E0'@*0				# = 1,… , 2 
This helps the Call rule to guarantee that no low security list can be updated by high security 
information (no write down). 
Another important issue in LCC are constraints. Constraints in LCC may have three 
functionalities: (1) conditions for other LCC operations (i.e. message passing and recursion) 
based on their returned value, (2) performing an action (e.g. doing intended jobs) and (3) 
updating some LCC terms (variables and structures). 
The proposed type system supports these functionalities. As a condition, the main issue is 
the secrecy of the functor (the constraint’s name) which is linked to the secrecy of readable 
arguments (τ type not  uTrm τ type). So even if the secrecy level of the functor is not defined by 
the user, it can be inferred from these arguments (if any exist). As an action, we need to ensure 
that the performed operation has security less than or equal to the defined level of the functor.  
In the proposed typing rules, we introduce the type rule Call for handling constraints, but we 
can extend it as below to support the updating functionality that accept read-write arguments; the 
type system needs to be modified slightly. 
| ⊢ 0ℎ#,:	-20	z, | ⊢ $:	z, | ⊢ y:	| ⊢ $y:	*&2	z ++2			 = z|	@y'}	z|'©y'}	z						# = 1,… , 2 
Γ⊢	T:	 rwTrm τ is a new type that means the read-write (input-ourput) identifier T in a 
constraint has a security level τ .This argument behaves as both a read-only identifier (type τ) 
and a write-only identifier (type uTrm τ), hence, the subtyping in rwTrm types is neither 
covariant nor contravariant and the security level of this argument can not be changed during 
type inference. 
As LCC makes no commitment to the method of solving constraints, different agents might 
use different constraint solvers locally or a remotely.  Hence, the assigned security types to the 
constraints limit the behaviour of (the external) constraint solver. We assume that the 
implementation of the constraint does not leak information. 
The proposed type system can be merged with the security type system of the constraint 
solver to achieve a comprehensive information flow analysis; if a constraint is implemented by a 
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version of Java that supports information flow, e.g. JIF (Myers, et al. 1997), security types and 
levels of the constraint’s arguments can be translated to the equivalent types and values.  
 
• Extension of the Dynamic Approach 
The proposed dynamic security analysis can be extended to detect and prevent implicit flow. As 
discussed in section  6.4.1, the main problem of the dynamic approach is inability to prevent 
implicit flows due to ignoring some execution paths of the LCC program. The LCC interpreter 
selects one of the branches whenever it reaches to a committed choice operator. This problem 
can be solved by adding a run-time control flow stack (Hennigan, Kerschbaumer, et al. 2011). 
The control flow stack is implemented as a run-time shadow stack that records the history of 
stack labels attached to a controller at each control flow branch. 
 
SL ⋃ CL 
SL 
… 
Fig.  6-8: The control flow stack. SL is the old stack label, CL is the security level of the 
constraint, the newly pushed stack label is SL ⋃ CL.  
   
The control flow stack is illustrated in Fig.  6-8; the newly pushed stack label when the 
control flow diverges is SL ⋃ CL, where SL is the old stack label and CL is the security level of 
the constraint. The following two rules in a control flow stack, detects implicit flow: 
1. If control flow diverges due to a conditional statement, a stack label is pushed onto 
the top of the control flow stack to indicate entry into the secure region. 
2. If a control flow merges, the top of the control flow stack is popped and the previous 
stack label is restored to the level it had before the branch in control flow occurred. 
 
We then need to merge the control flow stack mechanism with the Choice typing rule in 
Fig.  6-1. The following updated Choice rule incorporates the stack level SL in order to track the 
(nested) branches and detect implicit information flow.   
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Example: the following piece of LCC code leak secret information (the result of 
secretCondition) using implicit information flow: 
1.  (  
2.     publicInfo1 ⇒ a(publicAgent, p)   % security type of this line is op l. 
3.                                               secretCondition()   % security type: con h.  
4.                 or 
5.     publicInfo2 ⇒ a(publicAgent, p)   % security type of this line is op l. 
6. ) 
Let us assume the current stack label before running this code is l. CL is the security level of 
the constraint, so it is h.  The control flow of diverges in line 1 (start of a choice operator), thus 
based on the rule 1, the new SL is SL ⋃ CL, which is h, is pushed onto the top of control flow 
stack. Now, neither line 2, nor line 5 is allowed because in the typing rule we need z ≥ Ei 
(l ≥	h). Without using the control flow stack technique, line 5 is allowed in dynamic type 
checking, which is a security breach. 
The next section briefly describes implementation of a prototype security-typed LCC.  
 
6.9 Implementation 
The security type system and a prototype of dynamic security checking application have been 
implemented to demonstrate that the proposed framework is feasible and can be automated. 
There are several implementations of the LCC interpreter. However, the original version 
implemented in Prolog has been extended to support dynamic security type checking. The 
security type system is implemented in SICStus Prolog and a user interface for security analysis 
of LCC codes is designed in C#.NET. This tool is designed for annotation of LCC interaction 
models with security labels and performing the security type checking.    
  






Fig.  6-9: The user interface of the information flow analysis program for LCC codes 
 
Fig.  6-9 illustrates the user interface of the security-typed LCC prototype program. The user 
can write an LCC interaction model or import an existing one from a file.  In this first version of 
the security-typed LCC, security levels are defined manually by the user and terms which are not 
annotated are assigned to the highest security level (i.e. h). As a next step annotation may be 
done (semi)automatically by the matchmaker (at run-time).  
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An example annotation of an LCC interaction model that assigns security levels to LCC 
terms is shown in Fig.  6-10. 
  
 a(buyer, B) :: 
ask(X) => a(Seller, S)    then    price(X,P) ⇐ a(Seller, S)   then 
buy(X,P) => a(Seller, S) <- afford(X, P)   then 
sold(X, P) <= a(Seller, S) 
 
 a(Seller, S) :: 
ask(X) <= a(buyer, B) then  price(X,P)=>a(buyer, B)<-in_stock(X,P) then 
buy(X,P) <= a(buyer, B) then sold(X, P) => a(buyer, B) 
 
label(buyer, l).    label(B, l).      label(ask, l).    label(X, l). 
label(Seller, h).   label(S, h).      label(price, l).  label(P, l).      
label(buy, l).      label(afford, l). label(sold, l).   label(P, l).      
Fig.  6-10: Annotation of an LCC interaction model 
 
6.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have proposed a language-based information flow framework to analyse 
information leaks in LCC interaction models. The security-typed LCC has been introduced by 
inventing a security type system, which formally defines security levels, security types and the 
type inference rules. Next, the proposed type system has been evaluated and proven to hold basic 
and important properties; i.e. type soundness, simple security and confinement.  
We have discussed two approaches for applying the security type system on the LCC 
interaction models; dynamic (run-time) and static type checking. The LCC rewrite rules in the 
LCC interpreter have then been updated to support information flow analysis.  
Two disadvantages of dynamic information flow analysis are its inability to detect implicit 
information flows and late detection of insecure flow. All execution paths of the program are not 
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checked in dynamic analysis and some paths are disregarded, which could lead to implicit 
information flows. To overcome this problem we provide the following options: 
a) Extending the dynamic approach with the control flow stack mechanism described in 
section  6.8. 
b) Using the static approach instead of dynamic analysis:  
The static approach is a promising method that prevents insecure implicit and explicit 
flows, but it suffers mainly from non-permissiveness, so it may also reject genuine 
flows. Another drawback of the static analysis problem is that due to the dynamic 
behaviour of open MAS, there is a lack of information about the security classification 
of agents, constraints, etc. before run-time. 
c)  The combined approach: using both static and dynamic methods 
In this approach, static analysis is performed on an interaction model and if it is rejected, 
the system informs the user. The user then can decide to continue with the interaction 
model and perform dynamic checking at run-time. There is also a hybrid approach 
(Russo and Sabelfeld 2010), in which static and dynamic analysis are merged to take the 
best of both worlds. This is especially useful in flow sensitive analysis. In flow 
sensitivity, variables may store values of different sensitivity (low and high) over the 
course of the interaction. We leave flow-sensitivity analysis in LCC interaction models 
as a topic for future research.   
A drawback of the proposed security type-checking approach is its dependency on the LCC 
language which makes hard to apply on other MAS platforms. However, adaptation of the 
proposed security type system for similar first-class agent protocol languages such as MAP1 and 
RASA2 is straightforward.   
In this chapter, we have also formally defined the notion of non-interference in LCC 
interaction models and have shown that the proposed type system maintains this information 
flow property. The non-interference property guarantees that if an interaction model is run with 
                                                           
1 MAP: Multi-Agent Protocol language (Walton 2004) 
2 RASA (Miller and McBurney 2007) 
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different secret inputs, while holding the public values fixed, the public output (outgoing 
messages), which is observable by the adversary, must not change.  
Non-interference is considered as a restrictive property that may reject harmless interaction 
models for applications involving tasks such as authentication and data aggregation. Thus, 
sometimes we need declassification in order to release some secret information not worthwhile 
for the adversary. Another practical limitation of the language-based approach is difficulty to 
formalise intuitive policies using annotations. Realistic policies are complex and involve many 
stakeholders which makes hard to define conditions under which declassification may occur. 
In the next chapter, as a case study, the proposed security type system is applied to cloud 
management scenarios governed by LCC interaction models. 






7. A Case Study in Cloud Computing 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an application of open MAS in cloud computing, i.e. cloud 
configuration management, and investigate information leakage analysis using the proposed 
security type system in this case study. 
The cloud computing paradigm is a new class of network-based computing developed 
rapidly in the last few years to reduce administration and infrastructure costs. Cloud computing 
is predicted to revolutionise computing through reforming the management model of computing 
resource. It is also expected to be even more popular in the research community as well as 
industry in near future. Clouds can be viewed as a new generation of datacentres. 
Virtualisation technology is the core to most cloud computing models and has transformed 
the availability and management of computer resources. In a cloud, each physical machine (PM) 
is capable of hosting several virtual machines (VMs). VMs can be migrated without 
considerable interruption to the running services or any noticeable impact on performance of 
running applications. As a result, we can have highly available services through dynamic load 
balancing on clouds. 
The increasing popularity of clouds leads to new models and ideas for cloud computing; 
some examples are: “hybrid clouds”, in which some resources are in-house and others provided 
externally by different providers, “community clouds”, where resources are offered collectively 
using P2P technology, or “inter-cloud” (Bernstein, et al. 2009) as an interconnected global cloud 
of clouds. The above cloud paradigms enlarge their capabilities through engaging different 
parties.  
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Existing commercial tools for VM management are usually based on centralised control, in 
which performance information is collected from all of the VMs by a central service. The more 
the size and the complexity of clouds increase, the less attractive is the centralised management 
architecture. In the case of hybrid clouds, community clouds or inter-cloud there may no longer 
be a single organisation with ultimate authority over the entire sources. Hence, the centralised 
approach is no longer appropriate. 
This makes the MAS approach an appropriate solution to the problem of automatic cloud 
configuration management, especially where a globally optimal solution is not necessary or 
feasible. In this regard, we proposed a multi-agent VM management framework using LCC and 
the OpenKnowledge system in (Anderson, Bijani and Vichos 2012) and (Anderson, Bijani and 
Herry 2013). In this framework, agents negotiate to decide on VMs migration between 
themselves, without any need for a centralised authority. 
Security is a challenging problem in cloud computing, especially when the number of 
interconnected and composed services increases. Clouds raise new privacy and confidentiality 
concerns as data are usually managed by external parties on remote data centres and various 
services have access to them. It is vital to deal with privacy and confidentiality issues of cloud 
users as one of the most important security concerns to encourage them to migrate from 
traditional local data centres to the cloud computing paradigm. Otherwise, users should either 
deprive themselves from the advantages of could-based services or take the risk of exposing 
their confidentiality. 
Information leakage in cloud computing is a vulnerability that may cause serious privacy 
and confidentiality issues. This may happen in the scenario of virtual machine migration within a 
cloud (datacentre) or between clouds (datacentres). A case in which customers’ sensitive 
information is leaked in a cloud when a service provider can access multiple virtual machines is 
discussed by Wu et al. (2010). Another example of potential information leakage is when a 
virtual machine of a high risk organisation (such as a bank) is hosted on a same physical 
machine that the adversary’s virtual machine is resided. (Fig. 7-1). Ristenpart et al. (2009) 
describe cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target virtual machine on 
the same physical machine. 
 




Fig. 7-1: Vulnerable information flow in cloud computing caused by insecure virtual 
machine migration workflow 
 
In this chapter, the information leakage problem in cloud management is addressed using the 
proposed information flow analysis in Chapter 6. As mentioned before, information flow 
analysis can be a complement to traditional security mechanisms, not an alternative. Encryption 
may be considered as a countermeasure to explicit leakage via message passing, not to other 
implicit or explicit information leaks. Access control mechanisms can also prevent some 
insecure explicit information flows, nevertheless they are not able to detect and prevent implicit 
flows.  
Some of this chapter’s material related to VM management using LCC has been published in 
(Anderson, Bijani and Vichos 2012) and (Anderson, Bijani and Herry 2013). The VM 
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7.2 Autonomous Cloud Configuration Management 
In this section our multi-agent solution to the VM management problem proposed in (Anderson, 
Bijani and Vichos 2012) and (Anderson, Bijani and Herry 2013), is briefly introduced. The 
agents use the OpenKnowledge system to find suitable LCC interaction models and to identify 
appropriate peers. The Interaction models define the behaviour of agents located on the physical 
or virtual machines. The agents make autonomous decision on VM migration based on local 
capabilities, free computing resources, the financial relationship of both parties, etc. The 
migration may be either live, which is transparent to the cloud service users and occurs within a 
datacentre, or offline, in which a more complex workflow handles cloning the VMs and services 
between different datacentres, and involves notifying clients.  
 
7.2.1 Live Virtual Machine Management 
An example of the LCC interaction model for managing the negotiation and transfer of virtual 
machines between two physical machines in the same datacentre (i.e. where live migration is 
possible) is shown in Fig. 7-3. 
 In the first instance, we implement a policy which aims to migrate VMs from busy peers to 
underloaded peers in order to balance the load of each peer. There are three states: idle, 
overloaded and underloaded. The idle state is the initial and the goal state, in which the peer is 
balanced. Each peer is assumed to be balanced at the beginning of the interaction. It may then 
change state based on its load, or other factors. Fig. 7-2 shows the corresponding state diagram, 
in which single-corner rectangles, diamonds and dashed-arrows represent agent roles, 
constraints, and message passing between agents, respectively.  




Fig. 7-2: A simple Interaction diagram of a policy; unbalanced peers interact to balance 
their load 
 
In this scenario, once a peer becomes unbalanced, it advertises its status to the discovery 
service where it will be matched with potential candidates for a transfer. The peer then 
negotiates with these candidates to find one which is prepared to participate in the transfer. The 
conditions for acceptance of the transfer and the complexity of the negotiation are completely 
determined by the interaction models of the individual peers - these may depend on, for 
example, security policies or cost considerations as well as the capabilities of the physical 
machine (processing power, network bandwidth, memory, etc.). 
Fig. 7-3 shows the interaction diagram of a simple implementation of the live migration 
scenario. The constraint getPeerState(Status) checks the state of the agent and selects the next 
state based on the agent’s status. The constraint isMigrationPossible compares the Need of the 
virtual machine being migrated with the Capacity of the potential recipient. In our 
implementation we use a simple metric and a numerical comparison. In practice, this decision 
may be arbitrarily complex, and may be based on a number of parameters such as the available 
memory and load, or other characteristics. After an exchange of VMs, both agents revert to the 
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idle role. If they are balanced, no further action takes place; otherwise, they continue to interact 
as an underloaded or an overloaded peer. This interaction model makes a single decision to 
accept or reject the proposed transfer. In practice, a more complex negotiation may be involved 
to find the most appropriate recipient. 

































% Definition of the “idle” role. Here, “idle” means the “balanced” state 
a(idle, PeerID) ::  
  null <- getPeerState(Status) then %constraint to check the peer state  
%select the next state based on the peer's status 
( % if peer is overloaded, change its role to “overloaded”& pass the status 
    a(overloaded(Status), PeerID)<- isOverLoaded()  
  ) or  
  ( % if the peer is underloaded, change its role to “underloaded” 
    a(underloaded(Status), PeerID) <- isUnderLoaded()  
  ) or   
  a(idle, PeerID) % otherwise, remain in the idle role (recursion) 
% “overloaded” role Definition. “Need” is the amount of required resources  
a(overloaded(Need), PID1) :: 
  % send the “readyToMigrate(Need)” message to an underloaded peer 
readyToMigrate(Need) => a(underloaded, PID2) then 
  % wait to receive “migration(ok)” from the underloaded peer 
  migration(ok)<= a(underloaded, PID2) then 
  % live migration: send VMs from this peer to the underloaded peer 
  null <- migrateTo(PID2) then 
  a(idle, PID1) % change the peer's role to “idle” 
% “underloaded” role Definition. “Capacity”is the amount of free resources 
a(underloaded(Capacity), PID2) ::  
  % receive the “readyToMigrate(Need)” message from an overloaded peer 
readyToMigrate(Need)<= a(overloaded, PID1) then 
% send back the “migration(ok)” message, if the migration is possible, e.g. 
% free “Capacity” of this peer >“Need” of the overloaded peer  
(migration(ok)=> a(overloaded, PID1) <- isMigrationPossible(Capacity, Need))  
then null <- waitForMigration() ) 
    or  migration(notOk) => a(overloaded, PID1)  then 
  a(idle, PID1) % change the peer's role to “idle” 
Fig. 7-3: The LCC interaction model of the live virtual machine migration. 




7.2.2 Virtual Machine Migration between Datacentres 
Virtual machine migration within a datacentre (cloud) is not always possible, due to lack of 
resources, system support or cost.  
Moving virtual machines between datacentres presents further challenges: in general it is not 
possible to perform a live migration, and a new virtual machine must be started in the target 
datacentre, and the services transferred, before stopping the original virtual machine. The new 
machine will also have a different IP address, and possibly other differences, which mean that 
the migration may not be transparent to clients of the service. In this case, the clients will need to 
be notified about the change, and a comparatively complex workflow may be needed to avoid 
any break in the service. Once again, there may be no obvious central authority to sequence this 
workflow, and this motivates an agent-based approach to the workflow execution. Fig. 7-4  
illustrates the workflow of offline virtual machine migration. For detailed information of 
workflow-based virtual machine migration and relevant LCC codes see (Anderson, Bijani and 












Fig. 7-4: The workflow of offline virtual machine migration (Anderson, Bijani and 
Herry 2013); (a) the initial state and negotiations (dashed lines) between agents. (b) the 
final state where the VM has moved.  
 
In the interaction diagram (Fig. 7-5) of the LCC interaction model for offline virtual machine 
migration between datacentres, PID1 and PID2 are physical machine agents. PID1 starts with 
"initial" role, then by checking whether its VMs need to migrate, performs "emigrant" role. 
Similarly, PID2 changes its role from "initial" to "host", when it has enough resources, then if it 
is in a different datacentre, the offline migration process starts, by cloning new VMs.  The next 
step is changing its role to "manage-services" and asking all new "service" agents (SID2s) to 
start the service. PID2 then informs PID1 that the destination is ready by sending 
"migration(ok)" message.  Then, PID1 also changes its role to "manage-services" to stop current 
running services on datacentre1 by sending "do(shutdown)" message to  SID1 service agents.  
Consequently, SID1 agents ask client agent CID to redirect from this services to newly lunched 
services on new VMs by sending "do(redirect)" message. ClD then double check whether all 
necessary services are running in the new VMs by asking "check(running)" from each service 
agent SID2, then redirects to it. 




Fig. 7-5: The interaction diagram of an LCC interaction model for offline virtual 
machine migration between datacentres. 
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Fig. 7-6 illustrates some parts of the interaction model for offline virtual machine migration 
between datacentres. This is a simplified clause of an interaction model, in which some 
implementation details are omitted. The complete interaction model deals with exceptions and 
























% Definition of the "emigrant" role. 
a(emigrant, PID1) :: 
% acquire the migrating virtual machine info and the list of services on it. 
null <- getVMprofile(VID1,V_Profile)and getServiceList(VID,SID_List) then 
% send a message to check availability of the required resources 
requiredResources(Load) => a(host, PID2) <- getPeerState(Load) then 
% receive the answer about the required services 
requiredResources(ok) <= a(host, PID2) then 
% send a message to check availability of the required services 
readyToMigrate(V_Profile, SID_List) => a(host, PID2) then 
% wait to receive "migration(ok)" from the host peer 
migration( ok ) <= a(host, PID2) then 
% VM migration from this peer (emigrant) to a "host" peer 
(null <-same_location(PID1, PID2) then  
null <- live_migration(PID2, PID1, VID1) 
) or 
% next step of the offline migration 
(a(manage_services(SID_List, VID,  shutdown ), PID1) <- 
     not(same_location(PID1, PID2)) then 
   null <- destroy(VID) 
) then 
a(shutdown, PID1).   % change the peer's role to "shutdown" 
Fig. 7-6: One of the LCC clauses of the virtual machine migration between datacentres. 
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7.3 Information Flow Analysis of Virtual Machine Management 
The proposed security type system prevents and detects the information leaks. Having the 
security typing rules (section  6.2.2), the overloaded role definition in the LCC interaction model 
(Fig. 7-3, lines 12 to 20) and the security annotations in Fig. 7-7, we start our analysis. The 
security environment Γ	corresponding to the annotations is as follows: 
idle: l,PeerID: l,overloaded: l,PID1: l, underloaded: l, PID2:h, 















Fig. 7-7: Security label assignment to the LCC terms as annotations of the LCC code 
for the static security type check 
 
Let us also assume the amount of resource shortage in the overloaded virtual machines is a 
secret piece of information; i.e. Need: h.  
By static analysis of the role declaration in Fig. 7-3, line 13;a(overloaded(Need), PID1), 
we can prove that assigning the role overloaded to an agent PID1 and passing the high argument 
Need to this role is not a permissible information flow: 
&-'+&.-.: +	{	|	| ⊢ &-'+&.-.: + ., + ≤ ℎ| ⊢ &-'+&.-.: ℎ E@, ~--.: ℎ	{	|| ⊢ ~--.: ℎ .| ⊢ &-'+&.-.~--.: ℎ E0'@*0, A1: +	{	|	| ⊢ A1: @y'}	+ ., + ≠ ℎ| ⊢ &-'+&.-.~--., A1: -20	? %20 
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Based on the annotations in Fig. 7-7, PID2 is a high security term; all the underloaded agents 
are assumed to be secret agents. Nevertheless, this is not always the case: e.g. a public physical 
machine in the datacentre with free resources for new virtual machines. If the secrecy level of 
PID2 is set to low; level(PID2, l), the secret term Need in line 15, reveals to a public agent 
PID2 as a part of the sent message. This is an illegal information flow from agent PID1 to agent 
PID2 that must not be allowed. 
This illustrates one of the limitations of the static approach (discussed in chapter 6) that does 
not have flexibility regarding run-time changes and can not handle variables having a different 
security label in each interaction. So, the security level of each term needs to be known and fixed 
before execution of the interaction model. 
To solve the problem we may either revise the annotation or change the code. If Need has the 
low secrecy level; i.e. label(Need, l),then line 13 will be a permissible flow: 
&-'+&.-.: +	{	|	| ⊢ &-'+&.-.: + ., ~--.: +	{	|| ⊢ ~--.: + .| ⊢ &-'+&.-.~--.: + E0'@*0, A1: +	{	|	| ⊢ A1: @y'}	+ .	| ⊢ &-'+&.-.~--., A1: -20	+ %20 
The next step is sending a message to the counterpart agent (line 16): 
readyToMigrate(Need) =>a(underloaded, PID2), 
in which the requirements of the overloaded agent PID1 is sent to an underloaded high agent 
PID2, using the readyToMigrate message. This is a flow from low to high, which is allowed:  
| ⊢ 0ℎ#,:	-20	+,			 '-.>y&7#'0-: +	{	|	| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-: + ., ~--.: +	{	|| ⊢ ~--.: + .| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-~--.: + E0'@*0,																																																																									
@2.-'+&.-.: +	{	|	| ⊢ @2.-'+&.-.: +	§ .,




















Fig. 7-8: Security label assignment to the LCC terms as annotations of the LCC code 
for the dynamic security type check 
 
To have a clearer overview of the steps in the static and dynamic security checks, Table  7-1 
shows an example that the dynamic checking fails to detect an illegal information flow, while 
the static checking prevents it (Table  7-2).  
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Table  7-1: An example of the dynamic type checking using Fig. 7-8 annotations that 
ignores an illegal implicit information flow in the live virtual machine migration 
interaction model 
The LCC code The Action in the 
LCC Interpreter 





ready <= a(overload,pid1) then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    









ready <= a(overload,pid1)then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    
  migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,pid1) 
 ) 







 | ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	ℎ, -20	ℎ ≤ 	-20	+| ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	+ E@,								| ⊢ '-.>: +, | ⊢ 	2--.: +| ⊢ '-.>2--.: + E0'@*0,																																																											| ⊢ &-'+&.-.: +, | ⊢ 3#.1:	@y'}	+| ⊢ &-'+&.-., 3#.1:	-20	+ %20| ⊢ '-.>2--. <= &-'+&., 3#.1: &3	+	 , 
OK 
a(underloaded(capacity),pid2):: 
ready <= a(overload,pid1) then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    













ready <= a(overload,pid1) then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    
migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,pid1) 
) 
If ¬closed( migrate 
(ok)=>a(overlo
ad, pid1) <- 
migratPossible
(…)then null<-




 | ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	ℎ, -20	ℎ ≤ 	-20	+| ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	+ E@,																																			| ⊢ &-'+&.: +, 			| ⊢ 3#.1:@0'}	+	| ⊢ &-'+&., 3#.1: 	-20	+	 %20, 																																					| ⊢ }#'0-: +, 		| ⊢ 2&0¢: +	| ⊢ }#'0-2&0¢: 	+	 E0'@*0| ⊢ }#'0-2&0¢ => &-'+&., 3#.1: &3	+	 E2. 
OK 
a(underloaded(capacity),pid2):: 
ready <= a(overload,pid1) then 
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    
  migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,pid1) 
) 









 | ⊢ '-.>2--. ≤ &-'+&., 3#.1: &3	+,| ⊢ }#'0-2&0¢ => &-'+&., 3#.1: &3	+| ⊢ '-.> <= &-'+&., 3#.10ℎ-2	}#'0-2&0¢ => &-'+&., 3#.1:	&3	+		 E- 
OK 




ready <= a(overload,pid1) then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, pid1) 
<- migratPossible(capacity,need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    






@2.-'+&.:	+, + ≤ ℎ| ⊢ @2.-'+&.: ℎ E@,																																						| ⊢ *3*#0>: ℎ| ⊢ @2.-'+&.*3*#0>: ℎ E0'@*0, | ⊢ 3#.2:	@y'}	ℎ
| ⊢ @2.-'+&.*3*#0>, 3#.2:-20	ℎ ≤ -20	+| ⊢ @2.-'+&.*3*#0>, 3#.2:	-20	+ E@ %20,| ⊢ '-.> <= &-'+&., 3#.1	0ℎ-2}#'0-2&0¢ => &-'+&., 3#.1:	&3	+| ⊢ ,  ∷ -$ ∶ 	&3	+ &+-
OK 
 
One possible implicit information leakage is in line 27 of the interaction model (Fig. 7-3), in 
which a low message is sent to a low agent (migrate(ok)=>a(overload,pid1)), based on a 
high constraint (migratPossible(Capacity,Need)). Here, Some information about available 
resources of the physical machine 2 (pid2) may be revealed to an adversary (pid1). Another 
similar implicit leakage based on the same high constraint is in line 29: 
migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,pid1). 
The following static security type checking detects and prevents the illegal implicit 
information flows (Table  7-2). Then an alarm is raised that determines the corresponding line of 
the code. 
 
Table  7-2: The static type checking (using Fig. 7-7 annotations) detects and prevents 
implicit information flows in the live virtual machine migration interaction model 






ready <= a(overload,PID1) then  
 ( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, PID1) 
<- migratPossible(Capacity,Need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
 ) or (    
  migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,PID1) 
 ) 




ready <= a(overload,PID1) then 
( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, PID1) 
<- migratPossible(Capacity,Need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
) or (  
migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,PID1) 
) 
  | ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	ℎ, -20	ℎ ≤ 	-20	+| ⊢ 0ℎ#,: -20	+ E@,| ⊢ '-.>: +, | ⊢ 	~--.: +| ⊢ '-.>~--.: + E0'@*0, | ⊢ &-'+&.-.: +, | ⊢ A1:	@y'}	+| ⊢ &-'+&.-., A1:	-20	+ %20	| ⊢ '-.>~--. <= &-'+&.,A1: &3	+	 , 
OK 




 ready <= a(overload,PID1) then  
( migrate(ok) =>a(overload, PID1) 
<- migratPossible(Capacity,Need) 
  then  null <- wait()  
) or (  
migrate(notOk)=>a(overload,PID1) 
) 




The possibility of information leakage in the scenario of virtual machine migration between 
datacentres (clouds) is more than migration within a (known) datacentre. This is because of the 
complexity of the migration workflow and the enormous number of agents representing different 
parties. Most of the above mentioned insecure flows in live migration are also possible in the 
offline migration setting. An example of revealing some information to an adversary is in 
Fig. 7-6, Line 10: 
readyToMigrate(V_Profile, SID_List) => a(host, PID2) 
in which information of a migrating virtual machine on PID1 and all of the required services 
running on it, are passed to any potential agent on another datacentre, probably on another cloud. 
Either the PID2 agent may itself be an adversary or it might send this information to a malicious 
agent, intentionally or unintentionally.  
Let us assume the following security levels for the above piece of LLC code:  
this: agent h, readyToMigrate:l,V_Profile: h, SID_List:h, host:lPID2: l, 
so the bellow static type rule detect and prevent any direct or indirect disclosure of 
information: 
'-.>y&7#'0-: +	{	|	| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-: + ., + ≤ ℎ| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-: ℎ E@, ¶_A'&$#+-: ℎ	{	|| ⊢ ¶_A'&$#+-: ℎ ., E_i#,0: ℎ	{	|| ⊢ E_i#,0: ℎ .| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-¶_A'&$#+-, E_i#,0: ℎ E0'@*0,
	| ⊢ 0ℎ#,:	-20	ℎ, ℎ&,0: +	{	|	| ⊢ ℎ&,0: +	§ ., A2: +	{	|| ⊢ A2: @y'}	+ .| ⊢ ℎ&,0, A2:	-20	+ %20	| ⊢ '-.>y&7#'0-¶_A'&$#+-, E_i#,0 ⇒ ℎ&,0, A2: &3	? E2. 
 




In this chapter, we have applied the proposed security-typed LCC to a cloud computing 
configuration case study, in which virtual machine migration is managed. The cloud computing 
paradigm is developed rapidly in the last few years and virtualisation technology is the core to 
most cloud computing models. Using MAS is an appropriate solution to the problem of 
automatic cloud configuration management, especially where a globally optimal solution is not 
necessary or feasible. Cloud security is one of the most important challenges of development of 
cloud computing. In cloud computing and consequently in applications such as VM 
management, information leakage is a vulnerability that may cause serious privacy and 
confidentiality issues.  
We have analysed the secrecy of LCC interaction models for live and offline VM migration 
and discussed information leaks. We have also shown the differences between dynamic and 
static security type checking in preventing insecure information flows by looking at different 
scenarios. 
Examples of information leakage in the cloud load balancing scenario are the amount of 
resource shortage in the overloaded VMs or the amount of free resources in the underloaded 
VMs. It is shown that this information may leak explicitly or implicitly. Both the dynamic and 
static security type checking techniques can detect explicit information flow, while the static 
approach can also prevent implicit leakage. 
Applying the proposed language-based security framework on the live and the offline 
migration scenarios resulted in rejection of inappropriate security policies and approval of secure 
policies in the VM configuration management.         
 







Open MASs are growing in popularity in the Multi-agent Systems community, while there still 
remain many potential gaps in their security. The limitations in protecting open MASs, in 
particular minimal information on the identity and behaviour of agents, make them particularly 
difficult to protect, but their openness attracts new applications, making new problems emerge. 
These vulnerabilities have many effects rendering security issues indispensible and further 
research necessary. Information leakage is an important vulnerability in open MAS that 
threatens confidentiality of information. 
A large body of work on information flow analysis has been developed in the area of 
information security, but the multi-agent community has not utilised it much. This research, 
therefore, represents an important step toward filling this security gap and equipping open MAS 
with techniques for preventing and diagnosing attacks.  




This thesis investigates security issues of open MASs governed by electronic institutions 
through finding and categorising potential attacks and security countermeasures and proposing 
formal frameworks for information flow analysis.  
This thesis proposes a taxonomy of attacks against open MASs, which can help understand 
the implications of attacks and their countermeasures. It also describes the various attacks 
possible in open MAS, some of which entail new concepts that cannot be found in conventional 
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computer networks (e.g. ontology attack). Then, the methods to secure open MAS against the 
defined attacks are reviewed and classified.  
Having focused on information leakage vulnerabilities in choreography systems using LCC, 
this thesis suggests two approaches to detect insecure information flows, conceptual modeling of 
interaction models and language-based information flow analysis. In conceptual modeling, 
interaction models are converted into another formalisation, then an existing tool analyses the 
new formalism to find information leaks. 
The main advantages of conceptual modelling over language-based approach are the 
independence of modeling approach from the LCC implementation and its flexibility in using 
existing secrecy analysis tools. This modelling approach is not depend on the implementation of 
the LCC interpreter (i.e. in Prolog or Java), as the model of the interactions are analysed not the 
LCC codes. Existing automated reasoning tools can be used to prevent information leakage, 
however we employed Counterdog. 
This thesis shows that the language-based security approach using static and dynamic type 
systems is applicable to open MAS. The static and dynamic analysis of LCC interaction models 
can detect insecurity and reveal where in the code it might arise. This thesis also introduces a 
prototype LCC interpreter that implements dynamic information flow analysis to protect 
confidentiality of a MAS.  
In the proposed frameworks, the confidentiality policy is specified by annotations of the 
LCC interaction models. Integration of the security policy descriptions into the LCC interaction 
models potentially enforces a richer set of security policies than conventional access control 
mechanisms. However, the annotations are separate from the main LCC code and can be in a 
different file. The advantage of this separation is that the security policy can be decided upon 
either by the designer, the implementer (who creates and shares the interaction model) or the 
customer (who downloads and uses the interaction model). 
Intuitively, a program is secure if all program runs look identical to an adversary. This well-
studied notion of security is known as non-interference that guarantees absence of any 
information flow between secret and public systems activities. In this thesis, non-interference is 
extended to be applicable to LCC interaction models. The contribution is a formal definition of 
non-interference in terms of the LCC clause expansion mechanism that guarantees high-security 
input to the program never affects low-security output. The proposed security-typed LCC 
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provides end-to-end confidentiality in open MAS. It means that it guarantees no insecure 
information flow through the agents’ interaction based on the defined security policy. The 
proposed security type system is then formally evaluated by proving progress and preservation 
properties to guarantee type soundness. 
The proposed security framework can be used by the designer, programmer or user of LCC 
interaction models without the need of any security expertise. Their main role would be defining 
the policy upon the detection of any leakage and specifying public and secret data, i.e. 
annotation of the LCC interaction model by identifying labels for LCC terms. Terms that have 
not been assigned any label have the default security label, which could also be defined by the 
user. However, inaccurate annotation may yield false positive results and wrong annotation may 
produce false negative outcomes.   
The main limitation of the language-based approach is its dependency on the specific 
language i.e. LCC which makes hard to apply on other MAS platforms. However, adaptation of 
the proposed security type system for similar first-class agent protocol languages (such as MAP 
and RASA) is straightforward.   
The proposed security frameworks focus on confidentiality to prevent information leakage, 
so they do not address security problems related to data integrity. Another practical limitation of 
both language-based and conceptual modeling approaches is difficulty to formalise intuitive 
policies using annotations; Realistic policies are complex and involve many stakeholders which 
makes hard to define conditions under which declassification may occur.    
This thesis also applies the information flow analysis framework to cloud management 
scenarios to make the type-based security approach more comprehensible. Two scenarios of 
virtual machine migration management using the LCC interaction models are introduced, in 
which insecure information flows are analysed.   
 
 
8.2 Future Work 
The work in this thesis has yielded some insight into the security issues and solutions in open 
MASs, but there is still much room for improvement. The following are some suggestions for 
research: 




• Study of other Languages 
We focused on LCC as the language for designing electronic institutions in a MAS. This work 
can be extended to other languages such as Multi-Agent Protocol language (MAP) and RASA. 
MAP (Walton 2004) is a variant of LCC developed on the basis of distributed dialogue protocols 
and RASA (Miller and McBurney 2007) is an extended version of LCC, in which the 
relationship between the protocol specification language and the underlying constraint language 
is taken into consideration. We would suggest applying information flow analysis techniques to 
these languages. 
 
• Extending the Interaction Modelling Approach  
The abstraction module in the conceptual representation for other information leakage analysis 
can be adapted to be more general. We suggest the conversion of LCC code to a process 
calculus, i.e. pi-calculus, because information flow analysis of process calculus is a well-studied 
area and there are plenty of frameworks for this purpose. 
 
Another direction for future research is the improvement of the proposed LCC-typed 
language: 
 
• Constraint Type Checking 
One possible extension of information flow analysis in LCC is combining the proposed security 
analysis of interaction models with security type checking of LCC constraints.  Different tasks 
(e.g. the virtual machine migration policy in the cloud management case study) may be defined 
either in the LCC code or within the constraints, or in the combination of both. The choice here 
depends on whichever is most appropriate in each individual case. However in this study the 
focus of our security analysis is on LCC interaction models, not on the constraints, which 
usually are implemented in another programming language (e.g. Java in the OpenKnowledge 
system).  To have thorough information flow analysis in LCC code and within constraints, our 
security analysis could be merged with an existing security Type system for Java components, 
e.g. Jif (Myers, et al. 1997).  




• Other Information Flow Properties 
Non-interference is too restrictive for many applications. It is also too coarse for some 
applications. Other information security properties such as opacity (Bryans, Koutny, et al., 
Opacity Generalised to Transition Systems 2008) can be investigated. Opacity (or non-
detectability) is an information flow property that shows the inability of an adversary to infer the 
truth of a specific piece of information from the interactions. 
This thesis has focused on one aspect of security, i.e. confidentiality. The other important 
aspect of security is integrity. In an information flow security approach, both confidentiality and 
integrity of information can be protected. In the case of integrity, instead of the notions of public 
and private information, we have trusted and untrusted information. In information flow 
analysis, integrity can be interpreted as trusted output does not depend on untrusted input. This 
implies that integrity is a dual to confidentiality (Hedin and Sabelfeld 2011). We would suggest 
defining security properties that guarantee integrity and studying agent’s interactions in this 
regards. 
  
• Automatic Annotation and Variable Security Levels 
It is not easy to annotate all terms in interaction models manually, especially in larger pieces of 
code. Human mistakes in manual annotations also are likely to occur. It might be the case where 
the security levels of different clauses in an interaction model are annotated by different users; 
here, there is a high probability of mismatch in security labels. 
Using variable security levels instead of constants is a solution to (semi)automatic 
annotation. In this method, the security levels are inferred from the structure of LCC terms in the 
form of constraints. The result of the annotation is a set of constraints showing the relationship 
between security levels. Regarding the automated annotation of constraints, as arguments in a 
constraint can be of different types, security types and levels can not be inferred from the 
structure of the constraint. So, the full automation of assigning types (and levels) to constraints is 
not possible and the user needs to be involved in the annotation process. 
Flow sensitivity requires storing values of different sensitivity (low and high) over the course of 
interaction by the LCC terms. We leave the automatic annotation and flow-sensitivity analysis in 
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A) Proof of Theorem  6-1 (Progress) in page 89 (cont.):  
Case Choice: i = %	&'	%( and i: &3	z, so %:	&3	z,			%(:	&3	z	
By the induction hypothesis	either A1 is a final step or else some A1’ exists that A1⇝ A1’.	Similarly,	either A2 is a final step or else some A2’ exists that A2⇝A2’. If one of them is a 
final step (closed), based on the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
*+&,-.%	&'	  ← *+&,-.%	∨ 	*+&,-.  
A1 or A2) is a final step.  If both A1 and A2 are not final steps, based on the following 
LCC rewriting rules: 
%	&'	%( !, ,	,
,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.%( 	∧ 		% ! , ,	,
,		" 
%	&'	%( !, ,	,
,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.% 	∧ 		%( ! , ,	,
,		" 
We have either	A1 or A2) ⇝A1’	or A1 or A2) ⇝	A2’.  	
Case Par: i = %	3'	%( and i: &3	z, so %:	&3	z,			%(:	&3	z	
By the induction hypothesis	either A1 is a final step or else some A1’ exists that A1⇝ A1’.	Similarly,	either A2 is a final step or else some A2’ exists that A2⇝A2’. If both A1 and A2 
are final steps (closed), based on the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
*+&,-.%	3'	  ← *+&,-.%	∧ 	*+&,-.  
A1 par A2 is a final step.  If A1 is a final step and A2⇝A2’, according to the following 
rewrite rule: 
%	3'	%( !, ,	,
,			"1	3'	"(							#$	%1 #,7# ,	72,A,1 		"1 	 ∧ 	%2 #,72,	7&,A,2		"2, 
A1 par A2 ⇝	A2’.  If A1⇝A1’	and A2 is a final step, A1 par A2 ⇝	A2’. 
If both A1 and A2 are not final steps, which means A1⇝A1’ and A2⇝A2’, based on the 
above LCC rewriting rule, A1 par A2 ⇝	A1’	par	A2’.   
 




By the induction hypothesis	either C is a final step or else some C’ exists that C⇝C’. If C 
is a final step, in the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
 ← 7 ⇐ % ! , ,	9⇐:;,
,∅		 * ← 7 ⇐ %												#$	7 ⇐ % ∈ 7 ∧ ,0#,$>, 
When message M is recived from A, either the evaluation of the satisfied(C) is true, so 
 ← 7 ⇐ % ! , ,	9⇐:;,
,∅		 * ← 7 ⇐ % or else  ← 7 ⇐ % !, ,	9⇐:;,
,∅		$+,- (it 
returns false). In either case, L ends up in a closed state which means a final step.   
If C⇝C’, it means that C	is a compound constraint C’ that is either equal to ¬C1,  C1	∧	C2 
or C1	∨	C2, so based on one of the following rewrite rules in Fig 2-2: 
,0#,$#-.¬ ← ¬,0#,$#-., 
,0#,$#-. ∨ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∨ 	,0#,$#-.( , 
,0#,$#-. ∧ ( ← ,0#,$#-. 	∧ 	,0#,$#-.( , 
then we have i ⇝ ′ ← 7 ⇐ %	. 
Case If4:  i = ,  ←  and  i: &3	z, so , :	-20	z and : *&2		z,	
By the induction hypothesis	either C is a final step or else some C’ exists that C⇝C’. If C 
is a final step, in the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
,  ←  !, ,	,
,∅		,  ∷  	 #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷   ∧ ,0#,$#-., 
If ,  is a valid clause, in the case that the evaluation of satisfied(C) is true, so  
, ⇝ ,  ∷   or else ,  ←  !, ,	,
,∅		$+,- (it returns false).   
If C	is a compound constraint, progress is guaranteed as it is shown in If2. 
Cases If3, And, Or, Not, Call and Struct are similar to case If2.  
Cases Snd and Rsv are subsets of cases If1 and If2 respectively. □ 
 
A) Proof of Theorem  6-2 (Preservation) in page 90 (cont.):  







We know that L is well-typed, so we have	%:	&3	τ	&'	%(:	&3	τ. According to the 
following rewrite rules: 
%1	&'	%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.%2 	 ∧ 		%1 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		" 
%1	&'	%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.%1 	 ∧ 		%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		" 
the transition L⇝L’ happens either by % ! ,,,
,		 " or when A1 is not a final step 
(¬closed(A1)), by %( ! ,,,
,		 ". 
If ¬closed(A2), the % !, ,,
,		 " can be derived by any of the clause expansion 
rewrite rules, some of the cases are shown; others are similar: 
1) Subcase % = ,  ←  
By the induction hypothesis, we have ,  ← : &3	z, A1⇝A1’ and %′: &3	z. The 
following rewrite rule, which deals with recursion in LCC, is the only rule that expands A1:   
,  ←  ! ,,,
,∅		,  ∷   #$	*+@,-A, ,  ∷   ∧ ,0#,$#-.. 
So we have  %O = ,  ∷ B. Consequently, %	&'	%( ⇝ 	,  ∷ B	&'	%( where %	&'	%(: op τ. 
2) Subcase % = 7 ⇒ % 
By the induction hypothesis, we have 7 ⇒ %: &3	z, A1⇝A1’ and %′: &3	z. The rewrite 
rule that handles A1 is only 7 ⇒ %	 !,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇒ %. So we have %O =*7 ⇒ %. Consequently, (%	&'	%( ⇝ 7 ⇒ %	&'	%( where %	&'	%(: op τ. 
3) Subcase % = 7 ⇐ % 
By the induction hypothesis, we have 7 ⇐ %: &3	z, A1⇝A1’ and %′: &3	z. The rewrite 
rule that handles A1 is only 7 ⇒ %	 !,,	,
,9⇒:; *7 ⇐ %. So we have %O =*7 ⇐ %. Consequently, %	&'	%( ⇝ 7 ⇐ %	&'	%( where %	&'	%(: op τ. 






By the induction hypothesis	either A1 is a final step or else some A1’ exists that A1⇝ A1’.	Similarly,	either A2 is a final step or else some A2’ exists that A2⇝A2’. If one of them is a 
final step (closed), based on the following LCC rewriting rule in Fig 2-2: 
*+&,-.%	&'	  ← *+&,-.%	∨ 	*+&,-.  
A1 or A2) is a final step.  If both A1 and A2 are not final steps, based on the following 
LCC rewriting rules: 
%1	&'	%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.%2 	 ∧ 		%1 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		" 
%1	&'	%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		 "																				#$	¬*+&,-.%1 	 ∧ 		%2 # ,7# ,	7&,A,		" 
We have either	A1 or A2) ⇝A1’	or A1 or A2) ⇝	A2’.  	
 
As we showed in the discussed cases, transition of L ⇝L’	preserve	the	type.	Other	typing	rules	 are	 similar	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 rule	 allows	 the	 inference	 of	 any	 un-typed	 LCC	expression.			 
 
